9781422279076

The Defeat of the Nazis: The Allied Victory in Europe

allow armored vehicles to function. But no sooner had the basic plan been formulated than reasons for delay began to pour in: troops could not be moved up in time, and Model decided that his forces were not sufficient for the task in hand. The April date passed, as did one in May, and at this stage several senior commanders began to have second thoughts about the whole operation: of these the two most important were General Alfred Jodl, chief of the OKW operations staff, and Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, recently recalled to service as inspector-general of armored forces following his dismissal after the battle for Moscow Both these men considered the offensive to be very dangerous in concept and that it should be abandoned. Guderian also felt that the new Panther battle tanks and Elefant tank-destroyers would be wasted, the divisions which were to use them having not yet been able to train properly. Hitler himself began to have doubts, as did von Manstein, but Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of the OKW, and Colonel- General Kurt Zeitzler, the OKH chief of staff, managed to overcome Hitler’s misgivings. The offensive was finally scheduled for July, by which time ample supplies of ammunition, troops, and new tanks would be available, it was believed. OPPOSITE : Protected by the thick armor of a tank from German air attack, Soviet officers plan their next move on the Eastern Front in 1943. By this time the Soviet forces were very nearly the equal of the German armies in essential weapons and fighting skills. ABOVE: German armor on the move near Kharkov in the summer of 1943. Lying in a German salient, and biting into the underside of the Soviet salient around Kursk, this was at the heart of the fighting that followed Germany’s strategic defeat in the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. RIGHT: Soviet infantry move into the ruined outskirts of Belgorod, to the north of Kharkov, as the Soviets sweep over to the counteroffensive after their triumph in the Battle of Kursk.

they were to be told of this too by a deserter before the offensive began. Although they did not know it, the German armies were to attack without any element of strategic surprise, and in only a few places did the first attacking formations achieve any measure of tactical surprise. With the exception of the immediate German start lines, the Kursk salient is excellent terrain for armored warfare, with low rolling hills of firm sandy soil and relatively few towns, the whole dotted with sunflower fields and orchards. Accordingly, the Germans massed most of their mobile forces to the north and south of the salient. Model’s

Utmost secrecy was to be observed as the preparations for the attack were made. Despite the German precautions in the matter of secrecy, the Soviets were kept fully informed of all that was happening by their in-country intelligence system and Swiss-based “Lucy” ring, whose main asset was probably a person working in the high- level communications or coding department in Berlin. By such means, the Soviet Stavka (high command) was able to keep a close watch on the progress of German preparations and make its own plans accordingly. Just about the only thing the Soviets did not know was the time appointed for the actual attack, but

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