The Gazette 1973

ENGLISH PROFESSIONAL CASES Bates v. Lord Hailsham

it made under the powers delegated to it by s 56. It was only required, under s 56, to consider before mak- ing the order the written submissions of the Council, so that even when a momentous change, such as that proposed in May by the Lord Chancellor, was to be made it was not required to extend the time limit or to provide an opportunity for representations by bodies other than the Council. (ii) In any event the delay in applying for the injunction had not been sufficiently explained. Ex parte injunctions were for cases of real urgency, where there had been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion. Duchess of Argyll v. Beuselinck Before Mr. Justice Megarry, 3 May 1972. Defendant solicitor not guilty of negligence for not advising client about tax liability. The plaintiff was desirous of getting her life story published and entered into a contract with L.I.P. Ltd. to act as her literary agents for the publication of a series of articles. She gave a retainer to the defendant, who was a solicitor and an author, in general terms in relation to the proposed memoirs. He was brought into the matter primarily to "vet" the proposed publications for libel, although he soon introduced the question of copyright. He found that what was in contemplation was to be "a minor industry" for the exploitation of the plaintiff's memoirs. Thoughts of income tax passed through his mind, but in the face of her resolute refusal to sell the diaries and other material on which the story was to be based he did not raise the matter further with her. On the eve of his departure abroad, L.I.P. Ltd. sent him a draft agreement with a newspaper group for the publication of a number of articles, but he was not allowed to take it away. He went abroad and received an urgent call from L.I.P. Ltd. to get the agreement approved at once. This approval was given by his articled clerk for whose action he admitted full responsibility. The form of the agreement involved the plaintiff in a considerable tax liability. She now claimed damages from the defendant on the grounds that he was negligent in that (i) if he had given her the advice which he ought to have given her, her tax liability would have been substantially reduced; and (ii) he had failed to advise her that the terms of the agreement should be considered by an experienced tax Counsel or an experienced accountant, or both. Held—-by Megarry, J., that whether or not the duty of care owed by the defendant was that of the average prudent solicitor, or that of the defendant himself, who had a reputation in the world of authorship, in the circumstances, especially his justifiable expectation that what appeared to be in contemplation was a "minor industry" for the multiple exploitation of the plaintiff's memoirs and the fact that someone else's draft agree- ment was put before him for approval, the defendant was not guilty of negligence. Judgment for defendant. Per Megarry, J. : No doubt the inexperienced solicitor is liable if he fails to attain the standard of a reasonably competent solicitor. If the client engages an expert, and doubtless expects some- commensurate fees, is he not entitled to expect some- thing more than the standard of the reasonably com- 127

Chancery Division; Megarry J ; 19th, 20th July, 1972. Ex-parte motion for injunction to prevent the Lord Chancellor from making professional rules rejected. The plaintiff was a solicitor and a member of the National Executive Committee of the British Legal Association ("the Association"). To that Association about 2,900 of the 26,000 solicitors with practising certificates belonged. On 1st May 1972 the Lord Chan- cellor announced at a press conference that it was pro- posed to abolish the scale fees prescribed under Sch 1 to the Solicitors' Remuneration Order 1883, as am- ended, and to apply the quantum meruit system under Sch 2 to all conveyancing transactions. Anticipating the draft order that the Lord Chancellor was required by s 56(3) of the Solicitors Act 1957 to send to the Council of the Law Society ("the Council") before any such order regulating the remuneration of solicitors in respect of non-contentious business was made by the Statutory Committee under s 56(2), the Association sent out a circular to all solicitors about the proposals. On or about 6th June the Law Society received a draft of the proposed order, for consideration by the Council and for the submission of observations within a month for consideration by the Committee, as provided by s 56. The date of the meeting of the Committee for the making of the order was fixed for 19th July at 4.30 p.m. On 21st June the draft order was published in full in the Law Society's Gazette. On 11th July the Association sent printed submissions to the committee. These con- cluded with a request that the order should not be approved at that juncture and that the Lord Chancellor should seek further consultations with the profession and professional organisations. On 14th July the Associa- tion despatched letters to each member of the com- mittee seeking further time and suggesting a deferment of the final decision "for perhaps two months". On 17th July the Association sent out a circular making a series of accusations against the Lord Chancellor and the Law Society. On 18th July the Lord Chancellor wrote to the Association saying that he saw no reason for postponing the meeting of the Committee or for refraining from making an order in such terms as the Committee approved. On the same day the plaintiff issued a writ against the members of the Committee. He contended that the draft sent to the Law Society had been prepared by the Lord Chancellor's department and had not been considered by the Committee, and claimed (i) a declaration that any order made by the Committee under s 56 would be ultra vires and void unless the draft had been considered by the Committee and an opportunity had been given for representations on the proposed order to be made by the Association and other representative bodies, and (ii) an injunction restraining the committee from making an order until those steps had been taken. At 2.00 p.m. on 19th July the plaintiff moved exparte for an injunction to stop the committee making an order at its meeting at 4.30 p.m. Held —The motion would be dismissed for the following reasons— (i) The Committee's function under s 56 was of a legislative and not an administrative, executive or quasi-judicial nature, and so it was not bound by rules of natural justice or by any general duty of fairness to consult all bodies that would be affected by the order