The Gazette 1973

together vertically against the wall of the fitter's shop, fell outwards, and struck the plaintiff. He was unable to return to work for twelve months. (2) After a trial before Butler J., the jury assessed damages for £8,307 and judgment was given for the amount against the defendant in July 1970. (3) The defendants, in appealing, contended : (1) That the accident could not have been foreseen by the defendants, and that the case should there- fore have been withdrawn from the jury. (2) That the findings of the jury subsequently men- tioned were without evidence : (a) That the steel plates were an unusual danger for the plaintiff, an invitee. (b) That the defendants should have been aware of this danger. (c) That the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence in allowing the dog to go behind the plates. (3) That the judge misdirected the jury in stating that they could have regard to the fact that the com- pany's foreman had not considered the steel doors to be dangerous, and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to come to the same conclusion. (4) That the damages awarded are excessive. There was evidence that the plaintiff and defendant's staff had passed these steel doors many times previously, and that they had not been dangerous. The only tech- nical witness for the defendant was the senior foreman, who confirmed the steel plates had been in position at least one year before the accident. He was not respon- sible for inspecting the plates. The majority of the Court held that the plaintiff was negligent in allowing the dog to go behind the plates because, unless some force was applied to the plates, there was no danger of their falling outwards. The Judge was not correct in refusing to withdraw the plaintiff's case from the jury. The defendants were sued as occupiers of the premises on which the plaintiff was injured. Accordingly their duty was to warn the plaintiff of any unusual dangers known to them. But the intrusion of the dog in knock- ig down the steel plates was not an unusual danger. The judge had misdirected himself on this issue. Accordingly the majority of the Supreme Court (Fitzgerald and McLoughlin J. J.) allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's action. The Chief Justice, dissenting, would have ordered a new trial. [Reidy v. Fry-Cadbury Ltd.; Supreme Court; un- reported; 12th May 1972.] Is it lawful to impose a sentence of penal servitude following upon the expiration of a sentence of imprisonment. (1) The applicant contends that two sentences of 3 years Penal Servitude imposed on him by the President in the Central Criminal Court in July, 1970 are un- lawful because they were to commence from the ex- piration of a sid months sentence imposed on him at the same time in respect of a separate offence. (2) On 12th October 1972, Mumaghan J., directed the Governor of Portlaoise Prison to certify in writing the grounds of detention of the applicant. (3) The applicant was not present at the hearings before Finlay J . on 23rd and 30th October 1972, when State Counsel satisfied the Court that, though the six months sentence had expried, the remaining sentence was lawful. (4) It is clear from statutory law, that, if an order

for a substituted sentence of penal servitude is made, it would not be valid if it were passed prior to the passing of sentence, but this does not prevent a sentence of penal servitude from dating in the future, as decided by Castro v. R, 6AC. Furthermore Section 20 of the Criminal Law (Ireland) Act 1828 sanctions this pro- cedure. [The State (Jones) v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison; Finlay J .; unreported; 6th November 1972.] Dismissal of Busman Violation of Constitutional Rights The Supreme Court (O'Dalaigh, C.J., Walsh and Budd, J.J.) held that the dismissal of a Dublin bus conductor by C.I.E. on October 29, 1960, was a violation of his constitutional rights. The Court upheld an appeal by John Meskell, Crumlin, against an order of Teevan, J., dismissing an action in which he had sought a declaration that his dismissal had been effected for the purpose of wrong- fully coercing him to undertake at all times to be a member of one of the designated trade unions and was a denial and violation of and an unlawful interference with his rights under the Constitution. He had also claimed damages. The Supreme Court referred the case back to the High Court for a trial on the question of damages. Mr. Justice Walsh, delivering the judgment of the Court, said that at all times Mr. Meskell had been a member in good standing of a trade union. When he joined the company, trade union membership was not an obligatory term of his employment. He had been a conductor for 15 years. As from 1958 trade union membership was made a condition of employment with the company. During the following years, complaints were made by trade unions that some of their members in C.I.E. had been falling into arrears with union dues and the other members resented working with them. Mr. Meskell was one of those who expressed this resent- ment. Eventually an agreement was reached between the unions and the company under which all workers in the particular section—about 3,000—would be dis- missed and offered new contracts of employment. An additional condition was that each worker would bind hmself to be a member of a union. Mr. Meskell refused to accept this arrangement. All the employees, with two exceptions, appeared to accept the arrangement. It appeared that on principle Mr. Meskell had no intention of signing such a form under duress. When the matter had been discussed at a meeting of the Workers' Union of Ireland, a majority voted in favour of adopting the new procedure, but Mr. Meskell had abstained on the grounds that the proposal was a violation of the individual's freedom of choice. Conspiracy issue Mr. Meskell had also sought a declaration that his dismissal was in pursuance of a conspiracy and a com- bination between the company, the I.T.G.W.U., the Workers' Union of Ireland and other bodies for the purpose of wrongfully coercing him to become a mem- ber of one of the unions. The company had denied that his dismissal had been effected for any of the reasons alleged. Mr. Justice Walsh held that Mr. Meskell was entitled to a declaration that his dismissal was a denial and violation of, and an unlawful interference with his 14