The Gazette 1973

meeting as they were entitled to and furthermore they did not desist from interfering and leave the building peaceably when requested to do so firstly by the Cathaoirleach and then by Sergeant Mulqueen who was in uniform. I am perfectly satisfied that the De- fendants entered the Town Hall with the express in- tention of disrupting this meeting. They allege that they were concerned with the housing needs of people in the Dun Laoghaire Borough but I am sure that the duly elected members of the Council are equally con- cerned and I cannot see how premeditated publicity stunts which prevent the democratically elected Coun- cil from getting on with its business can further the aims of the group which they represent. I am con- cerned by the statement made in Court by one of the Defendants that further meetings will be disrupted adding "that they needed to be disrupted" I must attempt to ensure that this threat will not materialise as far as the Defendants are concerned and in addition to the monetary penalty I shall impose for the offence of forcible occupation on which they are being con- victed I shall direct that each Defendant shall within 14 days enter into a bond in the Defendants Bond of £100 and a surety of £100 to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period of 12 months in default of entering the bond 14 days imprisonment and the following conditions shall be inserted in the bond. 1. Not to enter the Town Hall, Dun Laoghaire during the duration of the bond, and 2. Not to picket, molest or interfere in any way, by word or deed with any member, officer or em- ployee of Dun Laoghaire Corporation when going to or coming from any meeting of the Dun Laoghaire Corporation. [Attorney General v. Eugene Keogh and Aifan Griffin—unreported. ] The property qualifications for jurors and the limited right of women to act as jurors are not unconstitu- tional. The women Plaintiffs are charged with obstructing police officers in the due execution of their duty, and have elected to have the charges against them tried by a jury. However they fear that they would not get a fair trial from a jury confined to property holders. Accordingly they claim that some provisions of Section 2 and 3 of the Juries Act 1927 are inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid, and request a Declaration accordingly. The questions to be answered are : (1) Is there a presumption that the Juries Act 1927 is consistent with the Constitution? Counsel for plaintiffs contend that the Juries Act 1927 was a Pre-Constitution Act, and therefore there was no presumption of Constitutionalism in accordance with The State (Sheerin) v. Kennedy (1966) l.R. The Attorney-General contended that this Act was constitu- tional as the People, in enacting the Constitution must be presumed to have taken over the existing law, in- cluding the 1927 Act, unless proved inconsistent with the 1937 Constitution. However, O Dalaigh C.J. in McMahon v. Attorney General (1972) I.L.T.R. 106— had stated that "the Constitution of Ireland does not offer any presumption of Constitutionality to the Statute Roll of Saorstat Eireann." Accordingly the con- tention of the plaintiffs is well sustained, and there is no presumption of constitutionality in favour of the Juries Act 1927. 164

who enters in pursuance of a bona fide claim of right does not commit an offence. The White Paper on Local Government Re-Organisa- tion (Prl. 1572) which was laid before each house of the Oireachtas in February, 1971 states as a bald fact on Page 60 (Chapter 16. 6. 1.) "The Public have no general or absolute right to be present at local authority meetings; it is a matter for each local authority to decide whether or not to admit them. . . . ". No authority is given for this statement but in Street on "Local Government" at page 75 Note (b) to Section 15 Local Government Act, 1902 states that the provisions of the Procedure of Councils Order 1699 and Section 167 of the Grand Jury Act which made open to the public all meetings relating to proposals are absolute but their enactment indicates that the public have no general right of admission. The note refers to the case of Tenby Corporation v. Nason (1908) 1 Ch. 507. In that case the Defendant claimed a right to attend meetings of the borough Council of Tenby in any of three capacities : The first claim was not pressed (and the second claim does not concern us in this case but there is also a reference to it at page 160 of the White Paper on Local Government re-organisation). It was held on Appeal confirming a lower Court decision by Cosens Hardy M.R. at page 467 "I am clearly of opinion that there is not such right as the Defendant claimed and that no member of the public, be he burgess or not, has a right to attend meetings of the Council unless by express or implied permission of the Council itself." Buckley L.J. at page 468 states "No person had simply as a member of the public the right to say "open that door I will come in". He goes on to say at page 469 "It seems to me that the burgess is not entitled to say " I will come in and hear your deliberation". That decision in Tenby Corporation v. Mason seems to me to be still relevant in this country and I could find no decisions or statutory provisions to the contrary. With regard to the argument that the system of admittance by ticket or invitation is not democratic or in order, Section 62 of the Local Government Act, 1955 gives a local Authority power to make Standing Orders for the regulation of its meetings and procedure. In pursuance of this express Statutory authority the Corporation of Dun Laoghaire have adopted such Standing Orders on the 7th day of October, 1963 and Standing Order no. 47 (page 9) regulates and specifies the method of admittance of visitors which is the method objected to by the Defendant. I can find no justifica- tion for the argument that this method is either unlaw- ful or undemocratic. In view of the complexity of the law on the subject the Defendants may have genuinely but mistakenly believed that they had a right as citizens to enter the meeting and although the actual method of entry re- vealed a certain amount of clever planning I am dis- posed to give them the benefit of the doubt on the forcible entry charge and hold that they entered in pursuance of a bona fide belief and I shall dismiss that charge. With regard to the charge of forcible occupation I am satisfied that by their antics and interruptions in the Council Chamber the Defendants prevented the members of the Corporation from carrying on their (a) As a burgess of the Borough, (b) as a Press Representative, and (c) as a member of the public.