The Gazette 1973

In the event they chose the latter course. It was true that if they had chosen the former course, and by reason of such decision they were to lose their affiliation to Congress, the union might suffer thereby. Insofar as the Constitution of Congress was the result of an agreement freely entered into by the I.T.G.W.U. with the other affiliated unions, they chose to limit their own sovereignty by agreeing to the provisions in the Constitution. They had decided to abide by that agreement rather than to accept Mr. Murphy into membership in breach of it. "Therefore, in the final analysis, the real barrier to the plaintiff's failure to obtain entry to the I.T.G. W.U. is the decision of that union to abide by its agreement." Mr. Justice Walsh said that the defendant union in refusing to give its consent was also observing the terms of the Constitution of the Congress. Mr. Justice Walsh said the net question was whether the defendants could be forced to consent to the plaintiff's joining the I.T.G.W.U. on the grounds that their refusal to give such consent amounted to an infringement of the plaintiff's constitutional right to form associations and unions. "In my view the answer must be in the negative." Even if the rules of the defendant union had contained provisions relating to cesser of membership and even if the court were to consider itself free to write into it the words "such consent not to be unreasonably with- held" nothing in the circumstances of the case would warrant the court in holding that the consent was un- reasonably withheld. The real and effective barrier to Mr. Murphy's entry into the I.T.G.W.U. was the decision of that union not to take him without the consent of the defendant union. In the circumstances the defendants, in deciding to exercise such rights as they had under the same agreement, could not be held to have in any way infringed the constitutional right of Mr. Murphy. Accordingly the appeal was allowed, and Murnaghan J. was reversed. f Irish Independent, 20/12/1972.) [Murphy v. N.U.V.B.; Supreme Court; unreported; 19 December 1972.] Application refused in ca:e involving Bookmaker. De- claration sought that certificate of personal fitness is null and void. In the High Court in Dublin Mr. Justice Kenny refused an application on behalf of two Bray (Co. Wicklow) men to delete certain pleadings made in a defence by a Dublin bookmaker to an action arising out of a transaction at the bookmaker's office in Bray on May 15th. 1971. The plaintiffs are James Moran and Patrick Kinsella, both labourers, and both of Connolly Square. They are suing Superintendent Matthew-Sills, /and Mrs. Dorothy Power, trading as Richard Power of Palmerston Road, Dublin. In the pending action they are seeking a declaration that the purported certificate of personal fitness to hold a bookmakers' licence, given by Superintendent Sills to Mrs. Power, is null and void. They claim that on that date in question Mrs. Power accepted a bet from them in respect of certain horse races to run at various meetings in England that afternooij. The bets consisted of 10 doubles at 25p, 10 trebles at<25p, one accumulator of 25p in respect of five horses and three doubles at £1 and one treble at £2 in

respect of three horses. Each of the horses won, they claim, and Mrs. Power became liable to them in the sum of £31,721. In spite of repeated applications, Mrs. Power refused to pay them the money. Despite the objections of the plaintiffs to the grant- ing of a certificate of personal fitness, Superintendent Sills renewed the certificate following an application by her on November 7th, 1971. The plaintiffs seek a declaration that this certificate is null and void, and they also seek an injunction restraining Mrs. Power from receiving such certificate. In the course of her defence Mrs. Power pleads that, insofar as these proceedings have been commenced and continued for the purpose of attempting to force her to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of £31,721, they constitute an abuse of the proccss of the court and are a contempt of court. Mrs. Power also pleaded that the proceedings were not maintainable, .being against public policy, and claiming that the monies alleged to be due on foot of the alleged betting transaction were not revoverable in law. The plaintiffs asked that both the paragraphs in the defence be struck out. Mrs. Power, in her defence, also pleads that the claim does not disclose any cause of action against her. She denies having accepted the bets or that she became liable to the plaintiffs for the sum mentioned. If any sum were due (which she denies) she pleads that, because of a limit operated by her and well known to the plaintiffs, the maximum amount recoverable on bets of the kind detailed was £2,400. Mr. Noel Peart, S.C., for the plaintiffs, said that they were both motions to strike out certain paragraphs from the two defences on the grounds that they were vexa- tious and prejudicial. There was no claim in the action that the defendants, or either of them, pay any sums of money to the plaintiffs. In fact, he submitted that it was clear that no court could make an order for the payment of any money other than a sum for costs to the plaintiffs. Mr. Peart said that, in the first motion, the defendant had put in a paragraph in which it was alleged that these proceedings were not maintainable, being against public policy, and claiming that monies alleged to be due on foot of an alleged betting transaction were not revoverable in law. The proceedings, however, did not ask the court to deal with the payment of any sum on foot of any betting transaction. In the second motion Mrs. Power had entered a defence claiming that, insofar as these proceedings had been commenced and continued for the purpose of attempting to force her to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of £31,721, they constituted an abuse of the process of the court and were a contempt of court. "These proceedings may be vexatious," he said. "A punter who is not paid by a welching bookmaker is entitled to be vexatious, but he is not entitled to claim any sum of money, and these proceedings do not seek payment of any money. They are not commenced or are they continued for the purpose of forcing the defendant to pay £31,721, but they are being com- menced and continued for the purpose of depriving Mrs. Power of her bookmakers' licencc." Counsel on behalf of both defendants submitted that the defence pleadings were proper and that the full facts would have to be known by the court before the issue could be determined. 30