S.TRUEMAN PhD THESIS 2016

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inert. Collins and Yearley (1992) argued that the symmetrical treatment of human and non humans using the notion of heterogeneous engineering is intellectually and morally problematic because it removes humans from their pivotal role (Munir & Jones, 2004; Whittle & Spicer, 2008). To label an activity or object ‘technical’ is to define particular boundaries and associated moral orders (Rachel & Woolgar, 1995). Further the separation between human and non-human is neither natural nor inevitable but is instead the outcome of a division of labour (Bloomfield & Vurdubakis, 1994; Hetherington & Munro, 1997). Such a division challenges or reduces the unique richness of human agency and adopts an amoral and apolitical stance (Walsham, 1997). Actor-network theory supporters suggest that the symmetrical stance seeks to overcome the over emphasis given to human agency that is favoured in sociological studies. Actor-network scholars state (a) they do not attribute intentionally and similar properties to non-humans, (b) their conception of agency does not predispose intentionality, (c) they locate agency neither in human subjects nor in non-human objects, only within heterogeneous associations of humans and non-humans. In relation to the amoral and apolitical, Latour (1991) responded: ‘We are left with the accusation of immorality, apoliticism, or moral relativism ... [However] in order to make a diagnosis or a decision about the absurdity, the danger, the amorality, of the unrealism of an innovation, one must first describe the network’ (p. 130). Bijker, Hughes and Pinch (1987) simply refuted the idea that actor-network theory has to take any moral stance at all. In relation to this question the researcher did not adopt a position of extreme symmetry. However, the researcher acknowledges that in assuming a moderate symmetric stance towards humans and non-humans this facilitated a critical examination of the key