New Technologies in International Law / Tymofeyeva, Crhák et al.

‘messy’ the exercise of State sovereignty has become. 897 Evidently, sea crossings are placed under substantial (if not complete) surveillance vis-à-vis generating visual, ongoing knowledge by their ability to detect and trace migration movements. One might reasonably anticipate that the enhanced situational awareness would operationalize the effectiveness of SAR responses in the Mediterranean by European governments, thereby preventing further loss of life at sea by providing early warnings of distress situations as well as continuous alertness of an ongoing risk endangering life at sea. 898 Quite the opposite in fact, as this contribution goes on to show. At this juncture, it is essential to underscore that not only European border control agencies have utilised technologies, but humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in pro-active SAR in the Mediterranean have also embraced such advancements. 899 These private actors have been increasingly involved in ensuring that States are alerted about possible distress incidents and have used aerial surveillance as a tool of visibility for raising awareness among the wider public of violations of migrants’ rights at sea. 900 Underscoring the EU’s strategic focus on containing migration is the fact that the EU allocates more than one and a half billion euros on research and development for security control every year, with border security and mobility management as a top priority. 901 Moreso, between 2021 to 2027, the EU has earmarked 9.3 billion Euros for border surveillance funding through the establishment of the Integrated Border Management Fund, primarily dedicated to enhancing border protection. 902 This serves as a notable illustration of the chief focus of EU policies, prompting additional questions about the significant funds allocated for surveillance and defence, which remain largely unquestioned. Such high-tech missions have the aim to spot and stop migrant vessels even before they reach Europe’s borders, thereby facilitating political imperatives which carry foreseeable risks for the human rights of migrants who are stopped from accessing protection. It follows that the EU’s air surveillance relies heavily on the private sector, an opaque and unregulated web of arms lacking transparency, as well as tech companies contracted by Frontex, raising various ethical questions around the use of technologies, including AI, at borders. 903 These practices raise bewildering questions around the responsibility 897 FitzGerald D, ‘Remote control of migration: theorizing territoriality, shared coercion, and deterrence’ (2020) 46(1) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 4, p. 8. 898 The vacuum of human rights protection has been specifically referred to in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR see for instance: ECtHR Cyprus v Turkey, App no 25781/94 Judgment (10 May 2001) , para 78; ECtHR, Banković v Belgium, App no 52207/99 (12 December 2001) , para 80. 899 See, Alarm Phone, ‘About’ . 900 Lutterbeck D, ‘Airpower and Migration Control’ (2023) 28(5) Geopolitics 2016, p. 2025. 901 Binder C, ‘How the EU politicises research and development in border security’ ( King’s College London , 21 June 2022) . 902 Nowak J, ‘Drone Surveillance Operations in the Mediterranean: The Central Role of the Portuguese Economy and State in EU Border Control’ ( Border Criminologies , 26 February 2019) . 903 For analysis on one’s choice of AI-based technologies use, see Tasioulas J, ‘The role of the arts and humanities in thinking about artificial intelligence (AI)’ ( Ada Lovelace Institute , 14 June 2021) .

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