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of the Accords, and Australia, Mexico, and the Netherlands are parties to the Moon Agreement while also members of the Accords. Australia has stated that it believes that there is no conflict between the Accords and the Moon Agreement. 343 The Accords are not binding instruments of international law, so they are not on equal footing with treaties like the Moon Agreement. But Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal is seen as a dark omen for the Moon Agreement by some. Rightly asserting that due to the small number of parties to the Moon Agreement, any more defections to Artemis and subsequent withdrawals would be a death nail for the Moon Agreement. 344 Also notable is that the Accords proport to be in accordance with 4 out of the 5 core space treaties, the Moon Agreement notably absent from that list. 345 Perhaps the US is betting on its demise due to the low number of parties and counting on defections to the Accords. Saudi Arabia’s actions aside, I have seen no other overt conduct which in my opinion would be considered as taking an official position for the purposes of identifying subsequent practices, even with the additional members. But that can quickly change in relation to the abandonment of the Moon Agreement as previously discussed. There needs to be some repetition of subsequent practices to be meaningful too according to the ILC. 346 However, the duration and frequency of those new practices only need to be long enough to allow other states to become aware and react to those practices, but that can happen in a short amount of time. 347 The second prong of the subsequent practices test, agreements stemming from conduct, is quite straight forward. Section 10(2) of the Accords states that: “ The Signatories affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty…” This is clearly an agreement from the members that is commonly understood for the purposes of the VCLT. 348 It is important to note that the Russian space agency Roscommon compared President Trump’s 2020 order encouraging citizens to mine the Moon commercial purposes as policy colonialism. 349 However, Sergey Saveliev, the deputy general director for international cooperation at Roscommon, made the point that since the United States were not a party to the Moon Agreement they should be able to use and explore space resources in accordance with international law. 350 But if Russia wishes to establish their own base on the Moon, 351 they will need the resources 343 Australian Space Agency Letter to the 60 th UNOOSA Legal Subcommittee . 344 Wedenig S and Nelson JW, ‘The Moon Agreement: Hanging by a Thread?’ ( McGill Institute of Air and Space Law , 26 January 2023) . 345 Artemis Accords , preamble. 346 Supra, (n 333). 347 ICJ North Sea Continental Self (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/ Netherlands ), Judgement [1969] ICJ Rep 1969, p. 3, para 74. 348 VCLT 31(3)(b). 349 Daemmrich B, ‘Russia Compares Trump’s Space Mining Order to Colonialism’ ( The Moscow Times , 7 April 2020) accessed 4 November 2023. 350 Jamasmie C, ‘Russia slams Trump’s order to spur mining on the moon’ ( Mining. com , 9 April 2020) . accessed 4 November 2023. 351 Moskva News Agency, ‘Russia Plans Long-Term Base on the Moon-Space Agency’ The Moscow Times

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