Toothless European Citizenship / Šimon Uradnik

to the fact that this solution was designed to replace fairly categorical and courageous expression of dual citizenship, which might have created a reminiscence of prevailing Union citizenship over the nationality of a Member State, the change of wording might or even should be interpreted in view of intentions at that time. The objective behind this was probably to calm down opponents of even deeper integration of the Union whilst also to widen citizenship of the Union more autonomously. Furthermore, A. Schrauwen reads that it has entailed that ‘be additional to’ might be an alternation on the provision enshrining autonomous dual citizenship. 74 Moreover, since the Treaty of Lisbon has not maintained the version of the Treaty of Amsterdam but instead anchored the very similar language of the interim draft of the Constitution, which was supposed to establish citizenship of the Union matured from the embryonic stadium, 75 it might be valuable to theological or historical interpretations. A. Schrauwen further states the difference between these two formulations in an argument that citizenship of the Union which only complements the nationality of a Member State cannot be of an autonomous character, whereas Union citizenship which is additional to the Member State’s nationality might. That all also corresponds more to the picture which the Court of Justice has tried drawing in the ‘fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’ 76 which be citizenship of the Union. 77 Nonetheless, the rewording was a win-win situation for both camps; on the one hand, it pleased the integrationists for the reasons provided above, and, on the other, the replace it.’ See Report of the Select Committee on the EU of the House of Lords presented by Lord Tomlinson and Lord Maclennan „ Contribution to the work of the Convention“ [2003] CONV 598/03. 74 See Annette Schrauwen, ‘European Union Citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: Any Change at All?’ (2008) 15/1 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 59 60 accessed 9 th March 2023. 75 As would have Spanish Socialist members of the Convention called. For that purpose, see Contributo del Sig. Josep Borrell, membro della Convenzione, e dei Sigg. Carlos Carnero e Diego López Garrido, membri supplenti della Convenzione: “Una costituzione europea per la pace, la solidarietà e i diritti umani” [2002] CONV 455/02, 10. 76 Originally, the Court of Justice had used in Case of Grzelczyk a phrase of ‘is destined to be’, whereas, in Case of Rottmann, that was replaced by an expression of ‘is intended to be’. Even though the reformulation was not emphasised, it might have been related to the then new wording of the Treaty of Lisbon; hence, Union citizenship has not been only destined to be the fundamental status but already, after the Treaty was enacted, intended to be. 77 Annette Schrauwen, ‘European Union Citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: Any Change at All?’ (2008) 15/1 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 60.

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