Toothless European Citizenship / Šimon Uradnik

a general theoretical framework of legal relationships on the basis of the Kelsen’s and Czech jurisprudence’s postulates, which are afterwards applied to the situation of Union citizenship with regard to ius tractum . Whereby the author isolates the emergence, existence, and termination of Union citizenship as a public legal relationship. Subsequently, it is examined whether the derivativeness of the emergence sustains into the existence and termination, respectively. 3.2.1 Theory of Legal Relationships H. Kelsen defines a legal relationship as ‘the relation[ship] between legal subjects, that is, between the subject of an obligation and the subject of the corresponding right […] constituted by the legal order’. 213 Czech jurisprudence further develops that a legal relationship emerges, changes, or terminates on the basis of the intersection of two prerequisites, namely, the legal title and the legal fact . The legal title is an effective legal norm, which enshrines first the range of addressees of that norm, second legally relevant circumstances for that norm, and third legal effects of that norm — emergence, change, or termination of the legal relationship 214 — and to them connected specific commands, permissions, or authorisations. 215 H. Kelsen points: ‘By “norm” we mean that something ought to be or ought to happen.’. 216 On the other hand, the legal fact is that circumstance — yet manifested in the outer world — which is anticipated by the legal title, and to which the legal title links legal effects. 217 Albeit different types of legal facts can be divided by numerous frameworks, the most suitable categorisation for the purposes of this monograph is the one according to A. Gerloch, who distinguishes between the legal facts in compliance with the law and the legal facts contrary to the law on the one hand, and the volitional legal facts and the unvolitional legal facts on the other. 218 213 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (translated by Max Knight, University of California Press 1970) 163. 214 Aleš Gerloch, Teorie práva (4 th edition, Aleš Čeněk 2007) 160. 215 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (translated by Max Knight, University of California Press 1970) 5. 216 Ibid 4. 217 Viktor Knapp, Teorie práva (C. H. Beck 1995) 203. 218 A. Gerloch, thus, distinguishes between four categories of legal facts: lawful legal acts — volitional legal facts in compliance with the law; lawful legal events — unvolitional legal facts in compliance with the law; unlawful legal acts — volitional legal facts contrary to the law; unlawful legal status — unvolitional legal facts contrary to the law. For this purpose, see Aleš Gerloch, Teorie práva (4 th edition, Aleš Čeněk 2007) 161.

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