Toothless European Citizenship / Šimon Uradnik

of the law as it derives from the letter of the law. Nevertheless, he does not deny that different authors might come to a different conclusion in terms of the autonomy by different methods. Those might argue instead by the spirit of the law; hence, they might interpret the wording of Article 20 theologically with the emphasis on the intention of the authors of the Treaties, on the social purpose of Union citizenship or on the protection of human rights. For such an approach, the following chapter may serve well. If the Court of Justice takes such an approach and promulgates that a former Member State’s national does not lose Union citizenship, the author’s interpretation would also be affected since the legal title for the derivative termination would disappear; consequently, Union citizenship would no longer be of a derivative nature in the termination. However, until it happens so, the author must insist, from the presented point of view, that the only autonomous part or segment of the form-status of citizenship of the Union is the sole existence in between the emergence and the termination of Union citizenship as a public legal relationship. Ergo, the bond exists only during this sole autonomous existence. The question of the directness is further examined in the next chapter.

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