Toothless European Citizenship / Šimon Uradnik

have not been fulfilled. Therefore, the factual relationship between the European Union and a citizen of the Union is not of such quality that it would give rise to the factual relation in the form of the genuine link. The rule of real and effective nationality, by virtue of the ruling in the Nottebohm case, comprises two aforementioned elements — the genuine link and reciprocal rights and duties. On the basis of the latter, the author developed a theory of the direct bond in order to examine the quality of the legal relationship between the European Union and a citizen of the Union. Nonetheless, the element of reciprocal rights and duties, as stated by the International Court of Justice, has been augmented by the status as they together constitute the direct bond between an entity and an individual. Wherefore, the direct bond is that form of the sought legal relation. The direct bond consists of two complements: the content and the form, which reflect in its very name. The complement of the directness materialises by the nonvicarious content, thus, by the rights that are not vicarious by any intermediate subject or entity. On the other hand, the complement of the bond is given rise by the autonomous form, hence, by the autonomous status. Therefore, the author in the following two chapters has examined whether the form-status of Union citizenship may be considered autonomous, and whether the content-rights of Union citizenship may be regarded as nonvicarious. In assessing the former, ergo, the potential autonomous character of the formstatus of Union citizenship, the author has firstly observed the nature of the acquisition of citizenship of the Union. He agrees with the opinion of D. Kochenov that Union citizenship is not acquired on the basis of different iura of different Member States’ nationalities but rather by virtue of ius tractum . 283 An endemic ius amongst others which stands on the derivative nature of the acquisition of Union citizenship. There is no other way to become a Union citizen than by becoming the Member State’s national. In the following section, the author has drawn on this perspective in the final examination of the form-status. On the basis of the postulates of the normative legal theory of H. Kelsen, Union citizenship has been defined as a public legal relationship. On top of this, the author has introduced in English the Czech jurisprudence in the person of V. Knapp and A. Gerloch, on whose basis, the author 283 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’ (2009) 15/2 Columbia Journal of European Law 181.

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