2015 Informs Annual Meeting

MD62

INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

MD60 60-Room 111A, CC Panel Discussion: Encouraging Professionalism in the Classroom Sponsor: INFORM-ED Sponsored Session Chair: Cliff Ragsdale, Bank of America Professor, Virginia Tech, Dept. of Business Information Technology, Pamplin Hall, Room 1007, Blacksburg, VA, 24061, United States of America, Cliff.Ragsdale@vt.edu 1 - Encouraging Professionalism in the Classroom Moderator: Cliff Ragsdale, Bank of America Professor, Virginia Tech, Dept. of Business Information Technology, Pamplin Hall, Room 1007, Blacksburg, VA, 24061, United States of America, Cliff.Ragsdale@vt.edu, Panelists: James Cochran, Ronald Klimberg, Kevin Scheibe One of a professor’s roles as an educator is to prepare students for the professional workplace. The panelists in this session will share ideas related to how we might treat various aspects of our courses and classrooms as simulators of the professional workplace. Open discussion of these ideas with the audience is encouraged. MD61 61-Room 111B, CC Multilevel Optimization Problems in Energy Sponsor: ENRE – Energy II – Other (e.g., Policy, Natural Gas, Climate Change) Sponsored Session Chair: Sauleh Siddiqui, Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins University, 3400 N. Charles St. Latrobe 205, Baltimore, MD, 21218, United States of America, siddiqui@jhu.edu 1 - Strategic Bidding in Multi-unit Auctions with Storage of Electric Energy Chiara Lo Prete, Assistant Professor Of Energy Economics, The Increased supply variability due to the integration of renewables has raised interest in energy storage resources providing flexibility in the operation of electricity systems. One of the key issues to be addressed by market operators relates to the participation of these resources in wholesale energy markets. We develop a theoretical framework to analyze how the inclusion of storage affects incentives and opportunities for strategic bidding behavior in electricity markets. 2 - An Exact Solution Method for Binary Equilibrium Problems and the Power Market Uplift Problem Daniel Huppmann, Postdoctoral Fellow, Johns Hopkins University, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), 3400 N. Charles St., Baltimore, MD, 21218, United States of America, dh@dergelbesalon.at, Sauleh Siddiqui We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation and incentive-compatibility directly into an optimization framework in lieu of using a linearization, or relaxation of integrality conditions. The method endogenizes the trade-off between efficiency and compensation payments necessary to align incentives of players. We provide existence results and conditions under which this problem can be solved as a mixed-binary linear program. 3 - How Proactive Transmission Investments Can Incentivize Social Welfare Improving Gencos Investments? Enzo Sauma, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago, Chile, esauma@ing.puc.cl, David Pozo, Javier Contreras We propose a proactive three-level equilibrium model for power transmission and generation expansion. The lower level models the market outcome; the intermediate level models the equilibrium in generation capacity expansion; and the upper level models the transmission expansion. The second and third levels are modeled as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints. We study how proactive transmission investments can incentivize generation investments that improve social welfare. Pennsylvania State University, 213 Hosler Building, University Park, PA, 16802, United States of America, chiaraloprete@psu.edu, Uday Shanbhag

4 - The Impact of Withholding Flexibility: An Application to Ramp Bidding in Electricity Markets Ekaterina Moiseeva, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, SE-100 44, Stockholm, Sweden, moiseeva@kth.se, Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh, Sonja Wogrin We compare a one-level and a bilevel equilibrium game in which firms’ flexibility is either: decided at the same time as their production decisions; or sequentially. We analyze the impact that different market structures have on the equilibrium outcomes. Our findings are applied to the ramp bidding game in electricity markets. It is observed that electricity producers may strategically declare a lower ramp rate if they expect such decision to maximize their profit in the production stage. MD62 62-Room 112A, CC Spatial Optimization and Conservation Reserve Design Sponsor: ENRE – Environment I – Environment and Sustainability Sponsored Session Chair: Bistra Dilkina, Assistant Professor, Georgia Institute of Technolog, Klaus Bldg 1304, Atlanta, GA, 30332-0765, United States of America, bdilkina@cc.gatech.edu 1 - Land Development Uncertainties in the Dynamic Reserve Network Design Problem The (conservation) reserve network design problem is a challenge to solve because of the spatial and temporal nature of the problem, stochastic action costs and dynamic land markets. To plan cost-effective conservation over time under stochastic uncertainties, we propose multi-period MIP models for the budget- constrained selection of fully connected sites. The objective is to maximize a summed conservation value for a subset of site availability scenarios at the end of the planning time horizon. 2 - Wildlife Corridors in Harvest Scheduling Models: A Case Study in Northern Sweden In northern Sweden, commercial forestry and reindeer husbandry compete for forest resources. The former relies on timber - the latter on lichen. We present a new model for maximizing net timber revenues while maintaining a high quality corridor system for reindeer. The model can control such geometric characteristics as corridor length and width by incorporating path finding technology in a mixed integer programming framework. We illustrate the model with a case study in Sweden. 3 - Spatial Considerations and Optimum Reserve Design for Multiple Species Hayri Onal, University of Illinois, Urbana IL 61801, United States of America, h-onal@illinois.edu, Yicheng Wang We present a linear MIP model for designing a conservation reserve system for multiple species where compactness and connectivity of the reserves are imposed at species level. We consider both structural connectivity and functional connectivity of the selected sites. An empirical application to the protection of ten state endangered bird species in Illinois will be presented. 4 - Optimal Design of Nature Reserves Considering Connectivity and Buffer Zones Eduardo Alvarez-miranda, Universidad de Talca, Merced 437, Curicó, Chile, ealvarez@utalca.cl, Ivana Ljubic, Markus Sinnl, Marcos Goycoolea In this talk we present general ILP models, which address two spatial requirements of nature reserves: connectivity, to avoid spatial fragmentation; and the presence of buffer zones surrounding so-called core areas. Extensive experimental results on synthetic and realistic instances show the effectiveness of a specially tailored algorithm in providing optimal solutions in short computing times. Other desired spatial properties, such as compactness, are also discussed. Nahid Jafari, Postdoctoral Research Associate, University of Georgia, 180 East Green St,, Warnell School of Forestry and Natural R, Athens, GA, 30602, United States of America, nahid.jafari@uga.edu, Clinton Moore Rachel St. John, University of Washington, Box 352650, Seattle, WA, 98195-2650, United States of America, rachelstjohn1@gmail.com, Sandor Toth

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