2015 Informs Annual Meeting

SA47

INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

SA46 46-Room 104A, CC Empirical Research in Services and Retail Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations Sponsored Session Chair: Santiago Gallino, Tuck School of Business, 100 Tuck Hall, Co-Chair: Antonio Moreno-Garcia, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, Il, 60208, United States of America, a-morenogarcia@kellogg.northwestern.edu 1 - The Reference Effect of Delay Announcements Qiuping Yu, Assistant Professor, Indiana University, 1309 E. 10th Street, Bloomington, IN, 47405, United States of America, qiupyu@indiana.edu, Gad Allon, Achal Bassamboo, Pengfei Guo We study whether delay announcements induce the reference effect using data from a call center. Our empirical results show that customers are loss aversion in response to the delay announcements. We then provide insights on whether and how we should provide announcements to the customers accounting for their loss averse behavior. 2 - The Operational Value of Social Media Information Dennis Zhang, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60201, United States of America, j-zhang@kellogg.northwestern.edu, Antonio Moreno-Garcia, Santiago Gallino, Ruomeng Cui We study how social media information can be used to improve forecasting and discuss the implications of this relation for operations management. 3 - The Value of Rapid Delivery in Online Retailing Santiago Gallino, Tuck School of Business, 100 Tuck Hall, Hanover, NH, United States of America, santiago.gallino@tuck.dartmouth.edu, Marshall Fisher, Joseph (Jiaqi) Xu For online retailers who sell physical goods, every transaction has two main components: the physical product a customer buys and the services by which the retailer facilitates the customer’s purchase. Delivery speed is arguably the most important service component for online retailers. We use a quasi-natural experiment to assess the impact of faster delivery on revenue. 4 - A Holistic Perspective to Shrinkage: Antecedents and Consequences Daniel Corsten, IE Business School, Calle Maria de Moina 12 Bajo, Madrid, 28006, Spain, daniel.corsten@ie.edu, Shivom Aggarwal Vendor-side fraud has been overlooked in literature due to intractability, but poses to be significant antecedent of shrinkage. Using multi-store longitudinal data from a US retailer, we investigate holistic antecedents of shrinkage and how they affect store performance. The unified framework will contribute to extant literature on efficient retail operations. SA47 47-Room 104B, CC Emerging Topics in Healthcare Operations Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations Sponsored Session Chair: Mor Armony, NYU Stern, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY, 10012, United States of America, marmony@stern.nyu.edu 1 - An Examination of Early ICU Admissions based on a Physiologic Risk Score Wenqi Hu, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 4V, New York, NY, 10027, United States of America, whu17@gsb.columbia.edu, Gabriel Escobar, Carri Chan, José Zubizarreta Unplanned transfers of patients from the ward to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) can occur due to rapid deterioration and may increase the patients’ risk of death. This work examines the potential costs and benefits of preventive ICU admissions based on a new dynamic warning system. We find that preventive ICU admissions have the potential to improve patient outcomes, and physicians’ fears of needlessly clogging the ICU may not be as dire as initially assumed. Hanover, NH, United States of America, santiago.gallino@tuck.dartmouth.edu

4 - Capacity and Price-matching Competition with Strategic Consumers

Mikhail Nediak, Queen’s University, 143 Union Str., Kingston, ON, K7L3N6, Canada, mnediak@business.queensu.ca, Yossi Aviv, Andrei Bazhanov, Yuri Levin Price matching (PM) is important to all market participants since PM can not only mitigate the loss from strategic customer behavior but even lead to gains from higher levels of this behavior under competition. Retailer profit with PM can be less than the worst profit without PM. Manufacturer never benefits from PM except for branded products when the sales at reduced prices are undesirable. On the other hand, policymakers may encourage PM since it can improve the aggregate welfare.

SA45 45-Room 103C, CC Networks: Games and Control Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing Sponsored Session

Chair: Kimon Drakopoulos, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States of America, kimondr@mit.edu Co-Chair: Asu Ozdaglar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 32 Vassar St, Cambridge, MA, United States of America, asuman@mit.edu 1 - Controlling Epidemics on Networks Kimon Drakopoulos, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States of America, kimondr@mit.edu, Asu Ozdaglar, John Tsitsiklis We study the problem of optimally allocating curing resources to cure an epidemic on a graph. We assume a curing budget constraint at each time instant. We prove that for graphs with large CutWidth efficient curing is impossible while for graphs with small CutWidth, efficient curing is possible and provide a near optimal policy. 2 - Privacy Constrained Network Formation Ali Makhdoumi, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 32 Vassar St, Cambridge, MA, 02139, United States of America, makhdoum@mit.edu, Daron Acemoglu, Asu Ozdaglar, Azarakhsh Malekian With the increasing ease with which information can be shared in social media, the issue of privacy has become central for the functioning of various online platforms. In this talk, we consider how privacy concerns affect individual choices in the context of a network formation game. 3 - Consensus Expectations and Conventions Ben Golub, Assistant Professor, Harvard University, 1805 Cambridge St, Cambridge, MA, 02144, United States of America, ben.golub@gmail.com, Stephen Morris Players have uncertainty over both an external random variable and each other’s beliefs. We study the iteration of an operator that takes a network-weighted average of others’ expectations. By relating this process to a Markov chain, we characterize its limit, generalizing prior results on games with common priors and on complete-information network games. As applications, we study coordination games, over-the-counter financial markets, and the robustness of equilibrium. 4 - On the Efficiency of Networked Stackelberg Competition Adam Wierman, California Institute of Technology, 1200 E California Blvd, Pasadena, CA, 91125, adamw@caltech.edu, Desmond Cai, Yunjian Xu, Subhonmesh Bose We study the impact of strategic anticipative behavior in networked markets. We focus on the case of electricity markets and model the market as a game between a system operator (market maker) and generators at different nodes of the network. We compare the efficiency of a networked Stackelberg equilibrium, where generators anticipate the market clearing actions of the system operator, with a networked Cournot equilibrium, where generators are not anticipative.

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