The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter-6

Logistics is concerned with the movement and sustainment of armies in the field. Not only does

logistics sustain the movement tempo of an army, it also sustains its force density. Without

operational logistics an army would, by analogy, simply evaporate. In order for a modern industrial

army to maintain a militarily effective presence, its logistics system must be continuous. (Schneider

2015, 41–42)

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Logistical autonomy and cohesion. The abundance of resources made available in a

continuous manner was down to logistical autonomy and cohesion on the side of the

Germans. Aligned with the motto of decentralised decision-making, local decision-makers

such as a tank commanders autonomously decide, on the basis of their military intelligence,

what their demands for logistical support should be. They decide what quantity of supplies

can be carried in the ‘backpack’, and how much logistical support is needed from higher

logistical echelons. The range and variety of these individual logistical demands is managed

by staff members of the unit, who make decisions about short-term and long-term supply.

Long-term requirements included the provision of substantial contingencies, abundant static

and mobile resources beyond the immediate request, to anticipate shortfalls and potential

bottlenecks.

As a result, forces can be supplied whenever and wherever and in whatever situation

they find themselves. Logistical autonomy requires logistical cohesion, harmonizing the

procurement, movement, storage and means to make diverse resources (equipment,

supplies etc.) available in a continuous manner. Again, German logistical staff excelled in

establishing such cohesion between the Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe.

Due to these deciding factors, it is no surprise that the Germans did not face any major

bottlenecks and relatively little operational downtime, so that they kept their units moving and

ready to encounter the next battle. A logistical after-action-report of Panzergruppe Kleist

stated :

Between May 10 th and the capture of Calais, there was not a single supply crisis that

could not be resolved with the resources of the Group van Kleist, without in any way

interfering with command functions. (Frieser 2005, 107)

On the Allied side, logistical constraints amplified strategic and operational, as well as

tactical flexibility of movement, a critical capability in war. An example of French lack of

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