The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter-6

[TEXT BOX ENDS]

The Germans followed a principle of Logistical Independence (Frieser 2005). It posits that in

operational terms, the Schwerpunkt is equipped with abundance of supplies being made

permanently and continuously available to a fighting force. Oberst Zeitzler (Chief of Staff,

Panzergruppe Kleist ) relied on what he called the Rucksack-Prinzip (backpack principle). It

implies that a force has to have its own logistical capabilities to ‘carry with it’ (hence

backpack) resources, not to have resources delivered to a moving force. This principle was

operationalised by the following measures:

In addition to its organic supply elements, the Panzer Group was given three truck

transport battalions with a total cargo capacity of forty-eight hundred tons.

All 41,140 vehicles used were loaded to the limit of their cargo capacity with

ammunition, rations, and above all fuel.

So-called march movement tank depots were spaced along the planned march

movement routes from the assembly areas all the way to the border.

Abundantly stocked supply depots were set up near the border so that the units

could draw on them during the operation’s first phase.

The required ration, fuel, and ammunition convoys were ready for the advance

supply base, planned in Luxembourg, before the start of the offensive. (Frieser 2005,

107–8)

One invention, like no other, epitomises logistical independence: the Wehrmacht-

Einheitskanister (also labelled by the Allies as Jerrycan). It is a steel liquid fuel container holding

20 litres. To increase the speed of filling and draining it was fitted with a large spout and flip-top

closure. Its shape made it easily stackable and two of them could be carried by one soldier. More

importantly, they could be attached to motorised units and, when empty, replaced quickly, or

discarded altogether.

7 | P a g e