The Gazette 1971

Consequently this argument, even if well-founded, would help Mr. Haughey only if his refusal had been limited to questions dealing with the Red Cross monies. It was not so limited, so this argument was irrelevant to the circum- stances of this case. (2) Mr. Justice Henchy then dealt with the contention of counsel for Mr. Haughey that Standing Order 127 had not been made by the Dáil as required by the Constitution, and having examined the history of amendments to Standing Orders, he held that the challenge to the validity of Standing Order 127 must fail. It had been «contended (3) that if arguments against the jurisdiction of the Committee failed, Mr. Haughey was not in default of Section 3 (4) of the Act in that the questions he refused to answer were not questions to which the Committee could have legally required him to answer under oath. The basis of this submission was, firstly, that the Committee had no power to administer an oath to him because the Oireachtas Witnesses Oaths Act, 1924, did not apply and, secondly, that even if it did there was no compliance with Section 3 of the Act. That this submission was unmeritorious was shown by the fact that Mr. Haughey appeared before the Committee with a written statement which he read out under oath and in which he claimed to be entitled as of right to make under oath. It had been proved in that Court that John R. Tobin, clerk of the Committee, was duly authorised by the Ceann Comhairle on 23rd December 1970, to administer oaths and that it was he who administered the oath to Mr. Haughey. So that ground failed. (4) The point was taken quite rightly, that Section 3 (4) of the Act, being a penal provision, should be con- strued strictly. For that reason it was said that the certi- ficate of the offence given under the hand of the chair- man of the Committee was insufficient in that it did not specify what were the questions which Mr. Haughey was legally required to answer and which he refused to answer. It was argued that the charge against Mr. Haughey should be given in the certificate with the particularity of an indictment. If that were so, said Mr. Justice Henchy, he would be prepared to hold that the certi- ficate complied with that requirement. In the present case the certificate could have left Mr. Haughey in no doubt as to what offence he was being charged with and, considering that he had failed to yield the infor- mation sought by every question that was put to him, he could not be heard to say that the certificate with- held from him reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. The point taken was a purely technical one and, in his view, it was unsustainable. (5) Mr. Justice Henchy also rejected the submission made by counsel for Mr. Haughey that it should have been shown that the certificate was made by the unani- mous decision of the Committee. Mr. Justice Henchy said that when the matter was before the President of the High Court on 24th February 1971 the President gave liberty to Mr. Haughey to show cause why he should not be punished by filing either an affidavit or a notice showing cause. Mr. Haughey had chosen to file a statement of cause. He had supplied no evidence at the hearing in support of the cause shown but had applied for liberty to cross-examine the chair- man of the Committee. The reason given to the Court for that application was that it was intended by such cross-examination to establish (a) the conduct of the Committee at previous hearings (b) that one or two other witnesses had been allowed to give evidence before the Committee which

wholly or partly financed through grants or loans from a Government Minister. The Finance Minister may designate the bodies which the Council can bring within the scope of its operation. The rules for the Council provide against a Deputy, Senator, Dáil or Seanad nominee or full-time member of the public service being chairman. The Council will present to the Minister each year a report on the organ- isation and personnel practices in the public service. The Irish Independent (3rd April 1971) RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL CASES COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS ACT, 1970, HELD CONSTITUTIONAL The Divisional Court of the High Court, Dublin, which, on March 12th last imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment on Mr. Paraic Haughey, Raheny, Dublin, for contempt, yesterday gave its reasons for the decision. The reasons (with which the President of the High Court, Mr. Justice O'Keeffe, and Mr. Justice Murna- ghan agreed) were read by Mr. Justice Henchy. Mr. Haughey had been directed to show cause before the High Court why he should not be punished for contempt in refusing to answer questions put to him by the Committee of Public Accounts on February 17th last. Mr. Haughey challenged the validity under the Constitution of the Committee of Public Accounts of Dáil Eireann (Privilege and Procedure) Act, 1970. In the High Court, Mr. Haughey was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to six months imprisonment. The Court stated that it would give its reasons later and refused a stay of execution and also refused an appli- cation for bail, pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, granted a stay of execution pending the hearing of the appeal. Mr. Justice Henchy said that he first proposed to deal deal with the grounds (other than those challenging the constitutional validity of the Act) relied on as showing cause why Mr. Haughey should not be punished as if he had been guilty of contempt of the High Court. It was submitted that the powers and functions conferred on the Committee by the resolution of Dáil Eireann entrusting this inquiry to the Committee were ultra vires Standing Order 127 of the Standing Orders of Dáil Eireann. Standing Order 127 stated that the function of the Committee was "to examine and report to the Dáil upon the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by the Dáil to meet public expenditure and to suggest alterations and improvements in the form of the estimates submitted to the Dáil." It was the contention of counsel for Mr. Haughey that when Dáil Eireann by its resolution of 1st December 1970 entrusted to the Committee an examination of any monies transferred by the Irish Red Cross Society to a bank account into which monies voted by Dáil Eireann were or might have been lodged, it was seeking to endow it with functions beyond the ambit of those vested in it by Standing Order 127. The monies of the Irish Red Cross Society, it was said, derived from sources such as public subscriptions and Standing Order 127 gave no power to the Com- mittee to examine the expenditure of such monies. (1) This contention would not call into question the delegation to the Committee of an examination of the expenditure of the grant-in-aid for Northern Ireland. IS