The Gazette 1971

In regard to (2) I am influenced by the opinion of Mr. G. A. Rink, Q.G. (English Bar), who writes on this aspect of limitation : (a) Time would run from the date when the client sustained damage as a result of the negligence, but there is a divergence of opinion as to what that date is, the alternatives being : (i) the date when the client receives a defective opinion or draft document, or (ii) the date when he 2Cts to his detriment on the faith of such an opinion or draft document, or (iii) the date on which damage actually accrues. There is also a possibility that in some cases a barrister might—under the principle of Hedley Byrne

v Heller —be liable, in respect of a negligent opinion, to a person who is not his client. (b) The client should not have any special protec- tion because of the relationship between him and the barrister; but it would clearly be desirable that, if a barrister is liable for negligence in relation to pure paper work, the period of limitation should run (as it does in the case of solicitors) from the date of the negligent opinion or draft. Notwithstanding the different bases of the relationship between barrister and client and between solicitor and client it is both desirable and reasonable that the commencement of the period of limitation should be determined on the same bases for both branches of the profession. (10) 1940 A.C. 282. (11) White v Washington 1738 Cooke's Practice Cases 152. (12) Unreported; based on a press report. (13) Lake v Bushby 1949 2 All. E.R. 964 968. (14) See Halsbury, Laws of England, third edition, p. 100. (15) See Nocton v Lord Ashburton 1914 A.C. 932. (16) e.g. Ford and Anor. v White & Co. 1964 2 All. E.R. 755. (17) per Lord Devlin 1964 A.p. p. 526. (18) (1958) 2 All. E.R. 241. tence are parts of the criminal trial which can only be exercised by the courts. The High Court cannot punish a complainant for contempt of court summarily, because by Article 38, trial by jury of non-minor offences, including contempt, is mandatory. Obviously the Oireachtas, under the Constitution, could not de- clare contempt of one of its Committees to be contempt of Court. Although there was a presumption relating to the constitutionality of statutes passed by the Oireach- tas, this did not give the High Court an option to decide whether it could try a case of contempt sum- marily, or by a trial by jury, because the simple inquiry formula contemplated by the subsection did not authorise an intention to proceed by indictment. The full impact of this decision must await further clarifi- cation. It states the constitutional limitations on the enforcement powers over witnesses bv statutory tribu- nals and may thus be far-reaching. It would seem at first sight that penalties for failure to answer before these tribunals can be imposed only after trial and conviction by a jury.

(1) 1964 A.C. 465. (2) 1969 A.C. 191.

(3) p. 264. (4) p. 287.

(5) 1914 A.C. 932. (6) 1969 A.C. 199. (7) 1838 C.&P. 475. (8) Reproduced in Jesting Pilate (Woinarski), p. 131. (9) Montriou v Jefferys (1825) 2 C.&P. p. 116.

Editorial — Contempt of Court The decision of the Supreme Court delivered by the Chief Justice in the Paraic Haughey appeal will rank as historic. It seems strange that, as contempt of court was undoubtedly a misdemeanour punishable by a sentence without statutory limit, no court had previously adverted to the fact that it could consequently not be considered as a minor offence.

Eventually Section 3 (4) of the Committee of Public Accounts of Dail Eireann (Privilege and Procedure) Act 1970 was found unconstitutional. The main ground was that the subsection authorised the Committee to try and convict, and thereupon to send the offender forward to the High Court. Apart from the Com- mittee exercising a judicial function, contrary to Article 34, the Committee committed a breach of natural justice by being judge and jury. It was rightly emphasised that the courts cannot, under the Constitution be used as auxiliaries to enforce the purported convictions of other tribunals, and this may have far-reaching consequences. Under Article 38, indubitably trial, conviction and sen-

Third Judge not to sit in Court Another judge, District Justice Coghlan, has refused to sit in the 120-year-old Waterford Courthouse. From next Friday the district justice said yesterday, Water- ford summary, civil and juvenile cases will be held in Tramore House, a public building.

ferred to Dungarvan Courthouse, as was a recent meet- ing of the Waterford High Court. The Waterford City Manager, Mr. John Cassidy, said yesterday that the county registrar, Mr. Joseph Kenny, told him of the courthouse's condition. Mr. Kenny, he said, was to prepare a report on the feasib- ility of using a building known as the Bishop's Palace, as a temporary measure. Irish Independent.

Last February, the Hilary sitting of the Waterford Circuit Court had to be held in the local Protestant hall, and the Easter sitting earlier his week was trans-

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