IGEM Report 1: 2017-18 - THE CYCLONE DEBBIE REVIEW

The Cyclone Debbie Review

Warnings The national Emergency Alert (EA) telephone-based warning system sends voice messages to landlines and text messages to mobile phones in a defined geographic area. During Debbie, between 26 March and 5 April, 75 EA campaigns were issued across

Health Debbie was felt in one of the State’s 16 Hospital and Health Services (HHS) – that covering Mackay and the Whitsunday area. The activation showed that Queensland Health acquitted its disaster management accountabilities well. Most effort went into providing clinical support and mental health support. But public health advice about water, sewage, food hygiene, medicines and vaccines, hazardous waste, and vector control was also much in demand. Lessons related to technology, and systems used to communicate with staff could confuse, with staff viewing Bureau online videos

The Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) had put significant effort into developing the QLDTraffic website as a single source of truth for road closure. The Department of Communities, developed an online grants and electronic funds transfer (EFT) payments system, and released the People with vulnerabilities in disasters – a framework for an effective local response . The utilities sector also In mid-December 2016 the QDMC had held a pre-season exercise. Hazards Several agencies had made improvements to flood and storm tide hazard identification, and the communication of risks. In 2015, Queensland’s Tropical Cyclone Storm Tide Warning – Response System Handbook had been updated to include a list of 64 potential locations where the Bureau of Meteorology (the Bureau) would produce Storm Tide Warnings. In September 2016 the Bureau introduced standardised content, structure and language for flood warnings. The Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) had developed the Queensland Emergency Risk Management Framework. By March 2017 the QRA had worked with QFES, the Bureau and more than 40 priority councils to identify and recommend improvements to flood warning systems and design improved networks. We commend the success of this work. Child Safety and Disability Services (DCCSDS) had played a significant part in the state’s preparedness.

Queensland with more than 5.9 million messages sent to impacted areas. Evacuation planning The decision to evacuate is

a critical one. In some cases there were differing opinions between the state and local groups about the need for evacuation. We observe that differing decisions may be due to information on the situation being incompletely shared, or different snapshots of information considered at different times. We do note that decision- makers at state level and most local and district groups had only most likely and worst case scenarios, with little qualifying information about the probability of either. Response The SDCG coordinates disaster response operations for the QDMC. However, the proactive involvement of QDMC somewhat eclipsed its formal role. The SDCC provides a single point of truth about an event. One debrief comment was that “TC Debbie was probably the best planned disaster we have ever had.” However, some of those working in the Centre still noted scope for improvement, particularly in the areas of information requirements, report-writing, and systems for reporting.

slowing internal networks. Other learnings related to processes for deployment, coordination with aged-care facilities. Recovery

The transition at State-level from response to recovery has been supported, since June 2015, by the QRA (Queensland Reconstruction Authority) as a permanent agency. The State’s transition to recovery was fast. A State Recovery Coordinator (SRC) was appointed at 2.00pm on 28 March, while Debbie was still making landfall. Eight impacted council plans are included in Operation Queensland Recovery .

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The three concurrent events