IGEM Report 1: 2017-18 - THE CYCLONE DEBBIE REVIEW

Inspector-General Emergency Management

During Debbie between 26 March and 5 April, 75 EA campaigns were issued across Queensland with more than 5.9 million warning messages sent to impacted areas. Of these alerts, one warned of the impacting cyclone as it crossed the coast, and 39 were issued for the associated storm surge in coastal areas around the Whitsundays, Burdekin and Mackay. EAs were also issued for flooding in south Queensland. One EA was sent for flash flooding in the south east corner for the Tallebudgera Valley area of the Gold Coast, and seven alerts issued for the flooding of the Albert and Logan Rivers (around Scenic Rim, Gold Coast and Logan areas). In Central Queensland four alerts were sent for flash flooding, and a further four later in the week warning of the slow-onset flooding of the Fitzroy River. In addition, 12 EAs were issued advising of the immediate closure of schools in South East Queens- land, four for advice on recovery funding support and two issued to advise of the need to boil water in the Whitsundays. Overall, the use of EA as a tool during the event was seen by stakeholders as a success with some reservations about timeliness, accuracy and understanding. Evacuation planning The decision to evacuate is a critical one. In a cyclone, the triggers to evacuate are often contained in Storm Tide Warnings. During the event, the Bureau issued 24 warnings, from the initial one in the early hours of the 25 March 2017 to when the cyclone crossed in the afternoon of the 28 March 2017. In some cases there were differing opinions between the state and local groups about the need for evacuation. Mostly, directed evacuations happened at the request of local groups. Where state decisions were involved, they were either carried out as a voluntary evacuation or, later, through a locally-directed evacuation.

We observe that differing decisions may be due to information on the situation being incompletely shared, or different snapshots of information considered at different times. We do note that decision-makers at state level and most local and district groups had only most likely and worst case scenarios, with no qualifying information about the probability of either. This is explored in more detail later in the report. Response The coordination of disaster response operations for the QDMC is the role of the SDCG. The mechanics of the group worked well and were widely applauded by its membership. Its sessions were well- chaired, minuted and inclusive. However, the group operated in a different way to that in previous events. The proactive involvement of QDMC somewhat eclipsed its formal role. Requests from local and district groups for logistical support were relatively few in number – 25 over 19 days. One member commented on the focus of briefings on updates about numbers, rather than discussion on priorities, progress and cross-entity coordination. 81 Few decisions were required from the group as these were being made at QDMC-level. The Leadership Board, comprised of all directors-general, also regularly met during this period. The Director-General DPC also hosted teleconferences with the government leadership team before each QDMC meeting to ensure there was coordination across agencies and to ascertain support required at that level. Providing a single point of truth about the current state of an event is the role of the SDCC. The leadership team for the Centre established a calm and relaxed environment that permeated through to all and contributed towards efficient operations. One comment from the SDCC cell leader debrief was “that TC Debbie was probably the best planned disaster we have ever had.” Interviews with other stakeholders supported this, remarking on more efficient operations since the implementation of the SDCC improvement strategy.

State-level operations

Date

Queensland – State-level

22 March Tropical low identified

QDMC convened 4.51am • BoM predicts crossing coast south of Townsville as category 4 on 28 March 10.00am • Low named as TC Debbie 10.30am • SDCG Weather Telecon SDCC stood up SOC activated State deployment of QFES damage assessment teams EA campaigns delivered to coastal areas in Palm Island, Townsville, Burdekin, Whitsunday and Mackay shires Stand up of Mackay DDMG and Townsville DDMG QRA stood up 1,699 people evalucated from Ayr, Bowen, Cleveland Palms, Cungulla, Hamilton Island, Home Hill Hook Island, Long Island Palm Island, Proserpine and South Molle Island Between 5.00pm–12 midnight • TC intensified to category 4 off Whitsundays Morning (approx. 10.30am) • TC crossed over Whitsunday islands 12.40pm • TC Debbie made landfall Airlie Beach as a category 4 with 185–260 km/h wind gusts and 150–250 mm rainfall totals with 400mm in isolated areas 11.00am • SDCG telecon Reports of STC Debbie heavily impacting the Whitsunday and Mackay regional council areas 1.00pm • TC crossed over Proserpine as a category 3 2.00pm • SRC appointed Over 7,000 customers with Telstra fixed phone line disruptions Media: “Food Supplies commence; Qld Govt closes schools from Ayr to Proserpine” 10.00pm • TC crossed over Collinsville as a category 2 Early hours • System dissipated to a tropical low south west of Collinsville, moving south east QFES DART commences RDA Interstate assistance arrives from NSW and the ACT to support in RDA 11.00am • SDCG Telecon Over 65,000 customers in North Queensland without power Qld Government orders every school in region to close from Agnes Waters in the north to the NSW border in the south and west to Nanago 8.33am • Advice to departments to enact Business Continuity Plans Later • Queensland Government advises businesses to consider closing after midday

25 March

26 March

27 March

28 March

29 March

30 March

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The Cyclone Debbie Review

Lessons for delivering value and confidence through trust and empowerment