IGEM Report 1: 2017-18 - THE CYCLONE DEBBIE REVIEW

The Cyclone Debbie Review

Some local governments valued the level of information coming from the state. However some of those working in the Centre still noted scope for improvement, particularly in the areas of information requirements, report writing, and systems for reporting. Health At more than 80,000 staff, including the Queensland Ambulance Service, Queensland Health is the largest department in Government. 82 Any event that affects Queensland affects Queensland Health. While this review is more concerned with how the system of agencies working together operated, due to its size Queensland Health acts as a microcosm of the system itself. The immediate effects of Debbie were felt in just one of the state’s 16 Hospital and Health Services – Mackay – which covers both that city and its surrounds, and the Whitsunday area. Later demands emerged in Rockhampton as the river slowly rose. To cover the event the State Health Emergency Coordination Centre (SHECC) was also activated. Eleven other Hospital and Health Services contributed 179 staff to the response and recovery over the following four weeks. Most were clinical staff but the deployments also included mental health, public health, building, engineering and maintenance services and emergency management functions. While clinical support and mental health support dominated, public health advice about the usual post disaster issues, including water, sewage, food hygiene, medicines and vaccines, hazardous waste, and vector control, was much in demand. The activation showed that Queensland Health acquitted its disaster management accountabilities well. It proved the agency had the Enablers in place to activate and brief staff, coordinate operations with the Queensland Ambulance Service and keep the SHECC informed. It had the Capability to muster and deploy staff. Staff themselves were willing to deploy to assist others and had the commitment to work extended hours and manage changes inevitable in disasters. Internal health logistics ensured emergency operations centres were well staffed and equipped, deployment teams were fully resourced and the movement of critical medications and supplies continued.

The learnings of wider relevance were related to technology. The multiplicity of systems used to communicate with staff – Facebook, WhatsApp, and others – could confuse, and the increasing use of videos by the Bureau slowed internal networks as staff went online to keep up-to-date. Other learnings related to processes for deployment, coordination with aged-care facilities, and the need to manage internally the implications of government messaging. Recovery The transition at state government agency level from response to recovery has been supported by the presence, since June 2015, of the QRA as a permanent agency. 83 The QRA’s vision is to build a more disaster-resilient Queensland. 84 The Authority “stood up” at the same time as the SDCC on Saturday 25 March. QRA representatives were embedded in the SDCG early and, due to this and the increased planning for recovery, SDCG representatives considered the transition to recovery was better than previous events. The state’s transition to recovery was fast. The appointment of a State Recovery Coordinator under legislation was made at 2.00pm on 28 March, while Debbie was still making landfall on Airlie Beach. In late 2016 an Interim State Recovery Plan had been approved. This informed the event recovery plan, Operation Queensland Recovery . 85 The state’s preparations and actions matched those of some local governments which had also prepared for recovery early. As Debbie approached, DCCSDS contacted the various peak bodies that look after vulnerable people about the steps they needed to take. The Department was also quick to open up recovery hubs in affected communities. A number of pop-up recovery centres worked well, including one for displaced tourist workers for economic assistance, and one for “457 visa” cucumber pickers in Logan City. Eight impacted councils were advised about the creation of recovery plans and these plans are included in Operation Queensland Recovery as a benchmark for future events. Plans for the recovery functional areas of Human and Social, Economic, Environment, Building, and Roads and Transport, are also included.

State-level operations

State-level operations

Widespread areas of significant flooding occurring in the Logan and Albert River catchments Fitzroy River in Rockhampton rising with peaks expected at Yaamba and Rockhampton More than 170,000 customers in South East Queensland without power Stand up of Rockhampton DDMG Logal River peaks to exceed the major flood levels at Waterford and Eagleby Second interstate assistance deployment arrives to support RDA 11.00am • SDCG Telecon 1600 propoerties without power in South East Queensland 21,000 propoerties without power in North Queensland At this point, 588 properties deemed uninhabitable in central and North Queenslandand 76 properties deemed uninhabitable in South East Queensland Ergon has de-energised approximately 260 residential/business customers in Rockhampton 13,600 customers without power in North Queensland (Bowen, Prosperpine, Collinsville, Alligator Creek, Cannonvale, Sarina and Arlie Beach) Fitzroy River in Rockhampton peaks at major flood level (8.9m) 11.30am • SDCG Telecon SDCC Stood down 2.00pm • Strategic Leadership Meeting – SDCC Response to QRA Recovery Transition 300 customers in Proserpine and Airlie Beach without power, with restoration to be completed by 12 April 10.00am • SDCG Telecon

31 March

1 April

3 April

4 April

5 April

7 April

11 April

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5 STATE-LEVEL OPERATIONS

Evacuation planning • Response • Health • Recovery