AIRBUS - 2019 Registration Document

REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 2018

Corporate Governance  /   4.2 Interests of Directors and Principal Executive Officers

The elements of the Total Direct Compensation are described below:

Remuneration Element

Main Drivers

Performance Measures

Target and Maximum

1/3 of Total Direct Compensation (when performance achievement is 100% of target).

Reflects market value of position.

Not applicable.

Base Salary

Collective (50% of VR): divided between EBIT(1) (45%); Free Cash Flow(2) (45%) and RoCE (10%). Individual (50% of VR): Achievement of annual individual objectives, divided between Outcomes and Behaviour. Vesting ranges from 0% to 150% of initial grant, subject to performance over a three-year period. In principle, no vesting if cumulative negative EBIT. If cumulative EBIT is positive, vesting from 50% to 150% of grant based on EPS (75%) and Free Cash Flow (25%).

Rewards annual performance based on achievement of

The VR is targeted at 100% of the Base Salary for the CEO and, depending on the performance assessment, ranges from 0% to 200% of target. The VR is capped at 200% of the Base Salary. The original allocation to the CEO is capped at 100% of the Base Sa l ary at the time of grant. Since 2012, the following caps apply to Performance Units only: - - overall pay-out is capped at a maximum of 250% of the original value at the date of grant. - - The value that could result from share price increases is capped at 200% of the reference share price at the date of grant.

VR

Company performance measures and individual objectives.

Rewards long-term commitment and Company performance, and engagement on financial targets subject to cumulative performance over a three-year period.

4

LTIP

(1) The Company continues to use the term EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes). It is identical to Profit before finance cost and income taxes as defined by IFRS Rules. (2) Airbus defines the alternative performance measure free cash flow as the sum of (i) cash provided by operating activities and (ii) cash used for investing activities, minus (iii) change of securities, (iv) contribution to plan assets of pension schemes, (v) realised treasury swaps and (vi) bank activities (“Free Cash Flow” or “FCF”). It is a key indicator which allows the Company to measure the amount of cash flow generated from operations after cash used in investing activities.

levels of VR and LTIP will each amount to 100% of the CEO’s Base Salary.

As illustrated in the table below, the structure of the CEO’s Total Direct Compensation will remain unchanged in 2019. This will apply in the same way to a future CEO. Indeed, the on-target

SCENARIOS CURRENT CEO TOTAL DIRECT COMPENSATION

Indications are based on the current CEO’s remuneration and are in million euros.

Below Threshold

Target

“Below Threshold” includes annual Base Salary; VR at 0%; LTIP not vesting.

Maximum

“Target” includes Base Salary, VR at target and LTIP grant face value in cash and in shares. “Maximum” includes Base Salary; maximum VR value (200% of VR at target); maximum LTIP cash grant projected at vesting date (250% of grant value); maximum performance applicable to the number of shares granted (150%). The share price development is unpredictable. The final value of Performance Shares cannot be capped.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Base Salary Variable Remuneration (VR)

LTI paid in cash LTI paid in shares

141

Airbus / Registration Document 2018