Year 12 IB Extended Essays 2017

committee and Bissell recognised the importance of this report’s secrecy at the time, Bissell stated it “ was a potential political bombshell which might wreck U.S.-Soviet relations and disrupt Soviet cooperation in the final military defeat of Japan” (Coatney, 1993) There were clearly measures taken by the US government to ensure that US-Soviet relations were not affected by the massacre during the war, however in light of the Cold War, US-Soviet relations were affected by the massacre to a significant extent. Polish-Soviet relations were undoubtedly affected by the massacre to a significant extent during and after the war because of the long-lasting effects on Poland’s military and elite class (Cia.gov, 2017). To reiterate, the Soviet intention of the massacre was to ‘liquidate’ Poles such as officers, leaders and intellects which Stalin thought would form the nucleus of a post-war Polish resistance movement against the Communist takeover of Poland. Due to the success of Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet Union felt it necessary to form more alliances against Nazi Germany, subsequently the Sikorski–Mayski Agreement was signed with the Polish Government in Exile (Garlinksi, 1985). Pursuant to the agreement, there were attempts by General Władysław Anders to organise a Polish army under Soviet leadership, however persistent attempts made by Anders and Polish Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski to locate the missing officers executed at Katyn were unsuccessful. During a banquet on the 3 rd and 4 th of December 1941, the Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed by Sikorski, Stalin and Anders and the topic of the missing officers was also raised. Stalin brushed off the Polish inquiries and suggested the officers “ Have escaped”, when Anders asked where to he replied, “Well, to Manchuria” . Stalin’s lies only further convoluted Polish-Soviet relations and made meaningful collaboration with the Polish Government in Exile an impossibility (Sanford, 2006). Between 1941 and April 1943, Polish-Soviet relations were generally friendly and the period was one of direct diplomatic collaboration between the two Eastern European states, however their relations were still plagued by the question: Where were the missing Polish men? Polish-Soviet recriminations about the missing officers throughout 1942 became increasingly bitter, especially due to other diplomatic concerns. In wake of the Soviet Union’s decisive victory at Stalingrad, it was very difficult for the Poles to get any answers regarding their officers because Stalin had the ability to dismiss any claims or allegations made by the Poles due to the political leverage gained from their victory. The victory meant the Soviet Union could marginalise the Polish Government in Exile since the Allies had a priority of maintaining relations with the Soviet Union in order to win the war. The Allies would certainly back any claims made by the Soviet Union to preserve their alliance. Polish-Soviet relations reached a crisis point on the 13 th of April 1943 when Reichssender Berlin broadcasted a report on the discovery of mass graves of Polish officers, the massacres appeared to have been committed by the Soviets (Engel, 1993). In reaction to the revelations made by Reichssender Berlin , the London Poles contacted the Red Cross and demanded an investigation be made, unfortunately the Nazis had also contacted the Red Cross. Polish-Soviet relations seriously deteriorated at this point because Stalin utilised this coincidence to accuse the Poles of collaborating with the Nazis. Stalin now used the government-in-exile's reaction to the German discovery at Katyn as a pretext for breaking off diplomatic relations (Service, 2013). In the absence of the massacred ruling class of Poland and the Polish Government in