A Critique of Habermas' Theory of Practical Rationality

DISCUSSION

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of sociological analysis, but a permanent and essential aspect of social research. It might be possible to draw a general outline and formal theory of the fundamental requirements of a rational morality and politics. For Habermas, an a priori decision on practical issues does not eonforrri to the norm of rationality. However, Habermas' notion of free communi- cation as the formal precondition of rational politics is not only an a priori practical preference, but also may constitute a general criterion for decisions on practical issues. More specifically, the interest in the existence of free communication and the reproduction and maintenance of free discourse are both rational interests. Therefore, even if in a specific discourse there is consensus, we can reject the rationality of consensus if it does not conform to any of our two universal interests. This implies that a majority tyranny cannot be considered rational because it contradicts at least the interest in reproduction of free communication. Furthermore, those societal, economic, and political arrangements that contradict the interest in free discourse can be ruled irrational. This means, however, that Habermas' hypothetical situation of ideal speech might result in an irrational consensus. This is particu- larly the case when, due to lack of exact sociological knowledge, the objective outcome of the consensual policy undermines the structure of free communication. In conclusion, I would argue that (a) values are not reducible to the level of facts, and individuals are the best judges of their own interests. Hence, the inadequacy of the technocratic model. (b) The individual rational practical choice presupposes autonomy. Autonomy, however, requires free societal communication and ideal speech situations; whence the inadequacy of the decisionistic and historicist theory of practical relativism. (c) Although values are not reducible to the level of facts, they are not entirely disassociated from factual considerations. Furthermore, the autonomy of social institutions from individual inten- tions, and the reality of the unintended consequences of alternative policies create the possibility of "irrational consensus". Hence the inadequacy of Habermas' theory of rationality. (d) We should expect an increasing level of disagreement and diversity of opinion among the more intellectual and enlightened citizens. In other words, it is unlikely that democracy and critical debate will lead to increased consensus on