A Critique of Habermas' Theory of Practical Rationality

DISCUSSION

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C. CRITICISM OF HABERMAS' THEORY OF RATIONALITY

Habermas' systematic theory of rationality is definitely an important contribution to philosophy and the social sciences. In particular, the humanitarian and democratic premises of the theory are admirably insightful. The aesthetic and moral beauty of Habermas' theory, how- ever, cannot overcome its serious sociological misconceptions and shortcomings. In this paper, I am not concerned with a review of the literature of the criticisms expressed against Habermas' theory. Instead, I shall raise some sociological objections to Habermas' definition of practical rationality, and briefly criticize his notions of critique and free communication as the basis of rational policy-making. The fundamental problem with Habermas' theory of rationality is its rigid and sharp differentiation between the realm of ends and the realm of means, corresponding to the normative and technical social struc- tures, respectively. This does not mean that I advocate an economisfic reduction of symbolic interactions to the realm of instrumental actions. On the contrary, I emphasize a mutual interaction between the two systems. Habermas confuses his analytical and abstract dichotomy of the two systems with concrete reality, and that, in turn, leads to a naive formulation of his theory of rationality. More specifically, Habermas' rigid differentiation between systems of actions and interaction leads to a false assumption of the neutrality of technology, a naive rejection of the relevance of professional knowledge of facts for the choice of ends, and a utopian belief in the absolute harmony of the norms of efficiency and democracy. Let us consider these issues in more substantive detail. Habermas assumes that the rationality of means is independent from practical questions. For Habermas, there exist objective, practical interests underlying both technological knowledge and instrumental choice. This dialogical and practical precondition of the monological structure of natural science is the pragmatic interest in the domination and control of nature. Therefore a scientific statement is true if it fulfills this interest. But aside from this general, quasi-transcendental interest, the question of efficiency and the rationality of means is perceived by Habermas to be independent of practical considerations. That is why the choice of technical alternatives is determined by the use of pro- fessional scientific knowledge defined in a monological fashion. There