ASSOCIATE Magazine FBINAA Q2-2025

Continued from "Rescue Task Force", on page 56

FBINAA.ORG | Q2 2025

JAMES CULLEN, NA SESSION 243

By now, we are all aware that law enforcement’s first priority at an active shooter incident is to enter as quickly as possible, locate and confront the shooter, and to stop the killing. We continue to learn through past incidents that once that is accomplished, the priority then transitions to stop the dying, as time is of the essence. To accomplish that goal Fire, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and law enforcement need to coordinate their efforts and establish a standardized Rescue Task Force (RTF) protocol. If you have not already done so, now is the time to develop the procedures which will enable a specialized team of first responders to enter the scene, triage, and render aid as quickly as possible, when seconds count. Although there is a need to get Fire/EMS into the warm zone at an active shooter incident as fast as possible, we need to accomplish this not only timely but safely so that effective aid reaches victims in need. RTF accomplishes that mission.

L aw enforcement’s initial goal is to send a Contact Team in to engage and neutralize the shooter. Once the killing has been stopped, we need to transition quickly to stopping the dying. On scene law enforcement can begin rendering limited medical aid, securing a corridor, and coordinating initial transport of the most injured. However, the officers of the Contact Team are geared up to stop the shooter–they are not equipped for or have the capacity to deal with medical needs at a mass casualty incident. For a mass casualty response, more assistance is required and that is where the Rescue Task Force comes in. A Task Force is a temporary grouping under one leader for the purpose of accomplishing a definite objec tive 1 , in this case the mission is victim rescue. The Rescue Task Force (RTF) is a combination of resources assembled to support a specific mission or operational need. A Task Force will contain resources of different kinds and types. All resource elements within a Task Force must have common communications and a designated leader. 2 In this instance, the RTF is a squad of Fire/EMS personnel with dedicated law enforcement protection, who will enter the “warm zone” and move quickly to the victims and render medical aid. Ad ditional RTF teams can support, re-supply, and aid on-scene teams or they may leapfrog and continue to other victims in other areas. Operations continue and the RTF stays on scene until all victims are rescued and transported to medical facilities. Ongoing interagency communication and coordination make it all possible. Just as Columbine was law enforcement’s watershed moment, the Pulse Nightclub attack was the watershed moment for the need of the Rescue Task Force. Many victims bled out and might have survived if medical help had been quicker and more coordinated. Although Fire/EMS personnel entering the scene of an active shoot ing as quickly as possible is a paradigm shift from past standards, it is one that is rooted in necessity. After the Sandy Hook incident in 2012, The Hartford Consensus determined that longstanding practices of law enforcement, fire/rescue, and EMS responses were not optimally aligned to maximize victim survival. Now is

the time to apply these lessons to active shooter events. While efforts to isolate or stop the active shooter remain paramount, early hemorrhage control is critical to improving survival. The Hartford Consensus recommends that an integrated active shooter response should include the critical actions contained in the acronym THREAT: Threat suppression, Hemorrhage control, Rapid Extrication to safety, Assessment by medical providers, Transport to definitive care. 3 The THREAT concept is what Rescue Task Force is all about, the integrating of resources for a well coordinated and timely effort to save lives. The findings made by the Hartford Consensus were reinforced by the mass casualty incidents at the Pulse Night Club in 2016 4 and the Las Vegas Harvest Festival in 2017 5 . One area of concern is that law enforcement may still be searching for a second shooter or continuing to clear the building. “It is quite common during active shooter attacks for the police to receive many, often conflicting descriptions of the shooter(s). This means that even when the police find the dead body of a shooter, they cannot be certain that this was the only shooter. The police must therefore search the entire facility for other shooters before they can declare it clear. 6 However, FBI sta tistics from more than 20 years of data, delineate the fact that in 97.5 percent of active shooter incidents there is only one shooter and in the other 2.5 percent of the incidents there was more than one shooter but they tended to stay together. 7 Therefore, while a continued search is on-going, a protected corridor for access to the victims can be established and if needed an area is secured to serve as a casualty collection point (CCP). The Rescue Task Force, having law enforcement protection, can safely enter the “warm zone” which has already been cleared, to access the victims and save lives. Doing so can get triage and medical aid to victims much sooner than waiting for the building to be deemed “safe” or “cold”. As was stated by Dr. Nicholas Senn, the founder continued on page 58

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