The Gazette 1961 - 64

testatrix had made a valid donatio mortis causa of the insurance policy moneys to her sister or whether they went into residue, Plowman J. held that the moneys went into residue. The mere fact of sending the coupon to the sister was no evidence of a gift. Nor did the letter add anything. In any event, the claim was defeated by the fact that the coupon could not have been delivered until after the death because it bore the date October 23 on the postmark and the testatrix had died on October 22. There was no reason to hold that the mere fact of putting it in the posting box was equivalent to delivery to the donee. 105 S.J. 207. Libe! and Slander—mitigation of damages—evidence of reputation—particularisation of specific acts. In Plato Films v. Speidel (March 2, 1961) defendants, in an action for libel in a film, pleaded justification, and, in the alternative, that in mitiga– tion of damages, they would give evidence as to the character of the plaintiff. As particulars under the latter it was alleged that the pictures and words complained of were published as part of the film wherein the plaintiff was depicted as having been guilty of conduct therein set out "the truth of which the plaintiff in his amended statement of claim does not deny." The guilty conduct was then particularised under the description of various war crimes. The House of Lords (Lords Simonds, Radcliffe, Denning, Morris and Guest), dismissing an appeal from the Court of Appeal held that the evidence which a defendant in a libel action can give in mitigation of damages where he has failed to justify must be limited to the general reputation of the plaintiff, and cannot be extended to specific acts ; and that the defence should be amended so as to omit reference to the specific acts. (1961) i All England Reports, 876. Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment. In McKay v. Att.-Gen. (March 14, 1961) plaintiffs brought an action against the Attorney-General and two police officers for malicious prosecution, conspiracy, trespass and libel. The action arose out of convictions, later quashed, under the Betting and Lotteries Act, 1934. McNair J. dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their case (1960) C.L.Y. (1950). The Court of Appeal (Ormerod, Devlin and Danckwerts L.JJ.) held, dismissing the appeal, that the trial judge had correctly decided that there was no evidence to justify the plaintiffs' allegations ; the convictions had been quashed on purely legal points. The Times, March 15, 1961,

Medical Practitioner—swab left in body after operation— departurefrom normalprocedure. In Cooper v. Neville (March 9, 1961) C. had been awarded damages by the Supreme Court of Kenya for injuries sustained by her as the result of an abdominal swab left in her body in the course of an operation performed by N., a surgeon. The Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa had allowed N.'s appeal against the finding of negligence against him. The Judicial Committee (Lords Tucker, Denning and Morris) held, allowing C.'s appeal, that the finding of the trial judge should be restored, namely that if the swab was a mopping pack, it was negli– gence on the part of the person who used it, whether it was N. or his assistant, to lose control of it and leave it in the body ; if it was a restraining pack, then having regard to the small number used, their obvious position, the absence of movement and the lack of any particular need for haste at the end of the operation, it was negligent of N. not to have removed it, since the responsibility was on him, as he admitted, to do so. There was no justifi– cation for the departure from the normal routine. The Times, March 10, 1961. Bill of Costs may be "moderated" even if one year since payment has expired. On the application for taxation of a solicitor's bill of costs under s. 69 of the Solicitors Act, 1957, after payment of the bill, there is by virtue of sub-s. (2) proviso (ii) no jurisdiction to order taxation if twelve months since payment have expired before the order is made, notwithstanding that the applica– tion originated within the twelve months and that there are such special circumstances as would justify an order for taxation being made within the twelve months ; but, in such a case, the court may, under its inherent jurisdiction over solicitors as officers of the court, deal with the bill by ordering a taxation or "moderation", independently of the statute, either of the whole bill or of some items in it: and, on the facts in the present case, the taxation of an item of 3,500 guineas in a solicitor's bill, described as "Fee by way of general instructions, care and responsibility", followed by particulars, would be ordered under the inherent jurisdiction at the instance of his client, although the bill had been paid more than twelve months before the date of the hearing so held by Cross J. Storer & Co. v. Johnson (1890), 15 App. Cas. 203 applied. (EDITORIAL NOTE. In this case the court was satisfied that special circumstances, such as would have satisfied s. 69 (2) proviso (i) of the Solicitors Act, 1957, existed and the proposition stated above