The Gazette 1961 - 64

done so otherwise. In the circumstances the othef creditors of a deceased were at no real loss. (In re Calvert [1961] N.I., page 58.) Education—negligence—stupid prank. In Perry v. King Alfred School Society (October 27, 1961) a girl was injured at school when a heavy radiator on which she was sitting fell on her after two other pupils had tried to tip her off. The Court of Appeal (Sellers, Upjohn and Diplock L.JJ.) held, dismissing an appeal from a finding that the school was not negligent, that it was no part of the duty of a school to forsee every act of stupidity that might take place and that the appellants had failed to show (i) that the school should have been aware that the heater was inherently dangerous ; (2) that they knew that this girl and others like her were in the habit of playing with the radiators ; and (3) they ought to have known that some children were in the habit of rocking the radiators. (The Guardian, October 28, 1961.) Fraud—misrepresentation and undue influence—undue influence—Presumption—agreement between engaged couple. In Zamet v. Hyman (October 18, 1961) on August 4, 1955, an elderly widow engaged to an elderly widower executed at the office of her fiance's solicitor an agreement under seal, by which she relinquished all rights which she might have in her prospective husband's estate under the relevant statutory provisions, in consideration for which she would receive £600 on his death. The solicitor explained to her trie effect of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, and the Intestates' Estates Act, 1952, but no mention was made of the value of the prospective husband's estate. The marriage took place three days later. In July, 1958, the husband died intestate, leaving an estate of about £10,000. In proceedings to determine whether the agreement was binding on the widow, the Court of Appeal (Lord Evershed M.R., Donovan and Danckwerts L.JJ.), affirming Pennycuick J., held that the document executed by the widow was so seriously one-sided that it required strong proof, if it was to stand, that when she executed it she fully understood its significance. The onus on those claiming that the document was valid and binding of rebutting the presumption of undue influence by the deceased had not been discharged, and that, accordingly, the document should be delivered up for cancellation. (1961 All E.R.—III—933. Solicitors—negligence—purchase of annuity just before death. In Dunn v. Fairs, Blissard Barnes & Stone (October 26,1961) the plaintiff was the administrator

(B.A.), Deois M. McDowell (B.C.L.), Desmond J. O'Malley (B.C.L.), David A. Potterton, Make Nic Shiomoin (B.Comm.), Thomas K. Smith (B.C.L., LL.B.), Malcolm B. YafFe (B.A., LL.B.). 20 candidates attended; 13 passed. On the combined results of the Second and Third Law Examinations the Council has awarded a Gold Medal to James L. O'Keeffe, a Silver Medal to Francis J. O'Flynn and Special Certificates to Anthony C. Gore-Grimes, B.A., and Desmond J. O'Malley, B.C.L. DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEREST Bankruptcy—administration of insolvent estate—relation ship between stockbroker and client — proceeds of sale of securities standing to credit of deceased stockbroker— whether proof of debt on behalf of cestui que trust con stitutes election—Irish Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, 1857, section 22. An executor sold securities belonging to the estate which he was administering and they realised the sum of £4,759 45. 9d. They were sold through a stockbroker who subsequently died and whose estate was found to be insolvent. The deceased stockbroker's estate was being administered in bankruptcy under section 21 of the Bankruptcy Amendment Act (Northern Ireland), 1929, and at the date of his death there was standing to his credit in a bank the sum of £4,239 8s. 9d., which repres ented part of the proceeds of the sale. This was not immediately evident and in the meantime the executor had proved for the full debt of £4,759 45. 9d. When it transpired that the amount standing to the credit of the deceased in the bank in fact represented a part of the proceeds of the sale the executor sought to amend his proof of debt and to prove for the balance only, namely £519 i6s. od. He contended that the sum of £4,239 8s. gd., standing to the deceased stockbroker's credit being trust money did not vest in the Official Assignee. His application was opposed by the Official Assignee who, while not denying that the money was traceable to the sale of the securities and was therefore impressed with a trust, said that the applicant, by proving for a debt, had made an election to treat it as such and, con sequently, to take his chance on whatever dividend would come to him with the other creditors. It was held by McVeigh J. that the proving of the debt did not amount to any such election by the applicant and leave was given to amend as applied for. The learned judge said that he could not hold that the act of proving the debt made the trust money vest in the Official Assignee when it would not have