The Gazette 1961 - 64

of the estate of a woman who died of cancer in hospital. He alleged that just before her death the defendant solicitors had negligently caused or permitted the deceased to purchase an annuity of .£156 a year for £1,363, and that her estate was thereby deprived of that sum of money. Barry J. held that (i) the defendants were not negligent in relation to the deceased as they were faced with the dilemma of having to proceed with the purchase or take action which would have led the deceased to suspect that she was suffering from an incurable disease; they were entitled to assume that at the relevant time the doctors did not consider it un economic to invest in such an annuity ; (2) the defendants owed no duty to the present plaintiff. (The Times, October 27, 1961.) Vendor andpurchaser — contractfor sale—completion date. In Smith v. Mansi (October 20, 1961) Wilberforce J. held that where a vendor and purchaser of property fail to agree on the completion date for the sale there is no legally binding contract even though the parties have agreed on every other necessary term in the agreement. (The Guardian, October 21, 1961.) Crown proceedings—liability of Secretary of State— negligence to prisoner. (Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 do & ii Geo. 6, c. 44), s. 2.) The pursuer, at the time a prisoner, was injured when he fell from a scaffolding while working in prison. He brought an action for negligence against the Secretary of State for Scotland on the following grounds : (i) that the accident was caused through the fault of a fellow-prisoner, and (2) breach of the defender's statutory duty to provide safe equipment. Subsequently after the expiry of the limitation period, the pursuer amended the pleading by inserting as a futher cause of action, the defender's breach of the common law duty to take reasonable care of the prisoners under his control. The Sheriff's Court of Midlothian held that the amendment was good in that it did not radically alter the basis of the action. It also held that the action failed on grounds (i) and (2) because the master and servant relationship did not exist between the parties, and failed on the amendment because no specific averment of fault had been made against the defender or his servants. Keatings v. Secretary of State for Scotland (1961, 77 Sh. Ct. Rep. 113.) Tenantfor life—powers of-—leasingpowers. A tenant for life has no power to grant a lease of the settled land together with property of his own, at any rate where there is no provision for apportion ment of the rent. He may enter into an executory agreement for the grant of a lease, as opposed to an agreement for a lease which in equity is equivalent

to a lease, provided that the lease will be in confor mity with the Settled Land Act when it is granted. The tenant for life of certain properties in London agreed to grant three leases for terms of 99 years commencing not later than December, 1972. One of the leases was to include property of which he was the owner in fee. The rent payable was to be £17,500 per annum, which exceeded one-fifth of the aggregate annual value of all the properties. S. of the Settled Land Act, 1888, provides : " Save as hereinafter provided, every lease—(i) shall be by deed, and be made to take effect in possession not later than twelve months after its date . . ." S. (3) provides : " Where the land is contracted to be leased in lots, the entire amount of rent to be ultimately payable may be apportioned among the lots in any manner : Provided that . . . (iii) the rent reserved by any lease shall not exceed one-fifth part of the full annual value of the land comprised in that lease with the buildings thereon when com pleted." Held, (i) that in the absence of a provision for apportionment of the rent between his own property and the settled land, he had no power to grant a lease including both ; (2) that it was within his power to agree to grant leases to commence at a date more than twelve months after the date of the agreement; (3) that he had no power to grant the leases at the rent proposed, as it would be impossible to apportion the rents in such a way as to ensure that each property was let at a rent less than one-fifth of the full annual value. Re Rycroft's Settlement, Rycroft v. Rycroft (1961, 3 W.L.R. 890 ; 105 S.J. 649, Wilberforce J.) Memorandum. (Statute of Frauds (Ireland), 1695.) In Godley v. Power (1957) 95 I.L.T.R. 135 the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had orally agreed to purchase from him certain licensed premises, known as " Toby Jug ", Cappoquin, and certain articles therein. On the defendant attempting to with draw from the agreement the plaintiff brought an action for specific perofrmance and for breach of con tract. At the hearing the defendant's solicitor testified that the defendant had called with him and had in structed him that he had purchased the premises for £2,250. In the defendant's presence his solicitor telephoned the plaintiff's solicitor and later wrote to him confirming that the defendant had agreed to purchase the premises at the figure stated and that the vendor would be liable for one-half of the auctioneer's fees and asking him to have an inventory of articles included in the agreement for sale. The Supreme Court in Eire (Kingsmill-Moore, O'Daly and Martin Maguire JJ ; Maguire C.J. and Lavery J. dissenting, reversing Dixon J.) held that a contract had been concluded between the parties and that 99