The Gazette 1961 - 64

The appellant sent two letters to the Secretary of the Bar Council alleging professional misconduct against the respondent, who was a Queen's Counsel. When sued for libel the appellant pleaded that the letters were protected by absolute privilege. Held, by the Court of Appeal that the plea failed: Lincoln v. Daniels (1961) 3 W.L.R. 866; 105 S.J. 647, (Sellers, Devlin and Danckwerts L.JJ.) Master and servant—occupational disease. The duty of an employer towards a servant who is susceptible to an industrial disease does not extend to refusing to employ him in work which involves a risk. If the servant knows there is a slight risk and decides to take it, that is a matter for him. A company hired a young woman whom it had previously employed in jobs involving contact with grease and, later, greasy water and who had on each occasion contracted dermatitis as a result. The present job was similar, but she did not protest; however, when she contracted dermatitis again she sued the company for damages for personal injuries. Held, that the company had not failed to take reasonable care for the employee : Withers v. Perry Chain Co. (1961) i W.L.R. 1314 ; 105 S.J. 648, C.A. bankruptcy—share certificates held as security—reputed ownership. (Irish Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, 1857 (20 & 2.1 Vie. c. 60), s. 313). In Re McClement (1960) I.R. 141, where share certificates which did not contain any note on them requiring their production on a transfer were pledged by the registered owner, who later became bankrupt, and the pledgee allowed the pledger's name to remain on the register of shareholders, Budd J. held that the shares were, for the purposes of s. 313 of the Irish Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, 1857, in the order and disposition of the bankrupt as reputed owner by the consent of the pledgee, as were also shares similarly pledged which were transferred to the bankrupt upon trust to enable him to vote at company meetings. Shares issued by way of bonus on the shares held by the bankrupt as trustee and received by him without the transferor's knowledge were, however, not in the order and disposition of the bankrupt as reputed owner by the consent of the pledgee. Practice—third-party procedure. In Andrews v. Dunn & Co. : Belfast Ropework Co. (Third Party) (1960 N.I. 181) the plaintiff, whose eye was injured by a needle while stitching mattresses for his employers, the defendants, alleged that the injury was caused by the snapping of twine supplied to him by the defendants. On an application for

third-party directions under Ord. 16 r. 52, by the defendants who had issued a third party notice on the manufacturers of the twine, the defendants claimed that they had purchased the twine from the third party and that they could not reasonably have examined it before use. Lord MacDermott C.J. held that the defendants had made a sufficient prima facie case against the third party to entitle them to the order sought. Domestic Tribunal of Defendant Institute. In Lloyd v. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (October n, 1961) the plaintiff, a member of the defendant Institute, was employed by George S. May International Co. G.B. In August, 1961, a complaint was preferred against the plaintiff in respect of his professional activities. The com plaint alleged that the plaintiff was guilty of acts or defaults discreditable to a member of the Institute in that he was employed by an organisation which in its business as consultants or advisers in manage ment, costing and methods of business offered its services by advertising, so as to render himself liable to exclusion from the Institute. On a motion by the plaintiff to restrain the defendants from hearing or otherwise determining the question whether he had acted discreditably under the provisions of r. 21 (3) of the Institute's supplemental Royal Charter dated December 21, 1948, Wilberforce J., dismissing the motion, held, that since there was no evidence of any particular bias against the plaintiff himself but only evidence of an attitude of hostility against his employer, it would be wrong to say that an employee could not be given a fair trial in respect of his individual professional conduct. Accordingly, the issue should be left to the tribunal which the parties had contractually accepted. (The Times, October 12, 1961.) Contract—performance—remuneration at discretion of defendants. In Mann v. Shell Petroleum (October n, 1961) M. brought an action against S. for an alleged breach of a contract under which S. promised to pay M. remuneration commensurate with the degree of success achieved by him in a mission to Cuba which M. was to undertake for S. M. alleged that he negotiated the lifting of a boycott imposed on British goods by the Castro regime, and that he was accordingly entitled to £100,000 under contract. S. denied that the boycott was lifted as the result of M.'s negotiations. Salmon J., dismissing the claim on the facts, held, that the contract fell into that class in which the principal reserved the right to Administrative law — tribunals — proceedings before