The Gazette 1961 - 64

record and was in all respects and for all relevant purposes the equivalent of a note made by him in his own notebook, sufficiently shortly after the occurence of the conversations. He would have been entitled to refer to such a note had he made it. (ii) It was not the effect of the Judge's Rules to put a man who had been cautioned into a state of asylum free from any eavesdropping or potential use of anything he might say and the tendering of evidence of the conversations was not in breach of these rules. The appellants had been cautioned and one of them had actually said " I will keep what I have to say until I get to court " and counsel had submitted that a man who had been so cautioned was thereafter in a state of asylum and the cell into which he was put was his own " castle " and he should be entitled to feel himself free from any eavesdropping or potential use against him of anything that he might say during his incarceration in the cell. Winn J. delivering the judgment of the court said " The court cannot accept that exposition of the effect of the judges rules, nor does it feel that there is any substance at all in the complaint made by counsel for the appellant Rose that this was sharp practice on the part of the police." The learned judge went on to say that the court would not approve of the practice of setting up microphones in a cell for the purpose of recording what might be said therein but the appellants had brought on them selves what they suffered by being so fatuous as to shout incriminating observations across a corridor to one another. The usual caution given is a warning against this type of folly. The appeals against convictions were dismissed (R. v. Mills and R. v. Rose (1962) 3 All England Reports, page 298). Restrictive Trade Practices Tribunal: Intimidation of Witness after Proceedings had terminated: whether Contempt of Court. G. an official of a trade union gave evidence at the hearing before the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements of proceedings relating to an agreement between his union and an association of suppliers. The court held that the restrictions in the agreement were contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and persons party to the agreement were prevented by injunction from giving effect to it. The members of the committee of the same branch of the union as G caused him to appear at a special meeting to answer for his conduct and later also at a general meeting. At two further branch committee meetings at which G was not present, resolutions were passed purporting to deprive him of his honorary offices of branch delegate and treasurer. The Attorney General brought a motion for writs of attachment or for orders of committal against the members of the

committee of the trade union for alleged contempt of court in causing G to appear before a special committee and in purporting to remove him from his honorary positions. The Restrictive Practices Court refused the motion and on appeal to the Court of Appeal it was held that those respondents whose motive, whether predominant or not, was to punish G for having given evidence, had committed con tempt of court since they had victimised him, it being immaterial if one of the purposes actuating a respon dent was the purpose of punishment, that he had also other motives. The Restrictive Practises Court in refusing the motion had held that the general tenor of authority had indicated that the relevant conduct in victimising or intimidating the witness must take place while the proceedings were pending in order to constitute contempt of court. Lord Denning M.R. in his judgment said that he could not agree with this and said that in his view there could be no greater contempt than to intimidate a witness before he gives his evidence or to victimise him afterwards. His Lordship said " How can we expect a witness to give his evidence freely and frankly, as he ought to do, if he is liable, as soon as the case is over to be punished for it by those who dislike the evidence he has given ? " His Lordship continued " If this sort of thing could be done in a single case with impunity the news of it would soon get round. Witnesses in other cases would be unwilling to come forward to give evidence, or, if they did come forward, they would hesitate to speak the truth, for fear of the consequences." The appeal was allowed as against six of the ten respondents and they were ordered to pay the cost of the Attorney General. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted. (Attorney General v. Butterworth and others (1962), 3 All England Reports page 326). Sale of Land for Fictitious consideration to avoid certain Regulations: Suit to recover land not maintainable. The respondent, who owned 139 acres of land cultivated with rubber in Malaya, in order to avoid the Rubber Regulations of 1934, under which the permissible production of holdings of rubber land of more than 100 acres was assessed by an assessment committee whereas that of less than 100 acres was assessed by the local district officer, transferred 40 acres of the land to his son, the- appellant, for a purported consideration which was not in fact paid. The transfer was duly registered and a certificate of title issued to the son. Thereafter the father, having agreed to sell the 40 acres to a third party, asked his son to execute a power of attorney so as to enable him to transfer the land to the prospective purchaser. The son having refused to do so, the father brought 47