The Gazette 1961 - 64

Causes Act, 1950. This section provides that the court may, on application by petition by either a wife or husband against whom the decree of judicial separation has been made any time after the making of the decree reverse it on the grounds that it was obtained in the absence of the person making the application. The wife's solicitors were ordered to pay 15 o guineas towards the costs of the husband on the ground that their conduct of the proceedings for the reversal of the decree had been oppressive. The appeal of the wife's solicitors against this decision to the Court of Appeal was dismissed and it was held that their conduct which had resulted in the delaying the setting aside of the decree and causing the husband to become liable for substantial costs, was oppressive and that the order against them to pay the costs should stand. The Court found that the solicitors had been wanting in their duty as solicitors and as officers of the court and the jurisdiction to order them to pay costs was, in the view of Dankwerts, L.J., both punitive and com pensatory. (Wilkinson v. Wilkinson and anor. (1962) 3 W.L.R., page i.) The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for Ireland invites applications from members of the legal profession for the writing of a text-book on "Probate Practice and Procedure in the High Court and Circuit Court". The book should be an up-to-date text-book on Irish practice and procedure for the use of practising lawyers and students ; it should be designed to cover all aspects of Irish practice and procedure in Probate proceedings (con tentious and non-contentious), but should not deal at any great length with the general law on the subject which is available in current text-books. The work should contain approxi mately 300 pages with references to, and a full list of, all the relevant cases, statutes and Rules ; in addition there should be a full index. Applications, with qualifications of the applicant and a synopsis of the proposed lay out, should be sent to the Honorary Secretary on or before the zznd April, 1963. Any further information required may be obtained from : The Honorary Secretary, the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for Ireland, Law Library, Four Courts, Dublin 7.

in diminution of his loss, save in so far as it would not be fair or just to require him to do so. Where an employer was under no obligation to pay a disability pension but could withhold or reduce it at his discretion it would not be fair to take such a pension into account (see per Singleton, L.J., in Payne's case, supra), and it was open to the court to accept that as a ground of binding force and to discard the other reason given by Cohen, L.J. But in this case it was fair and just that regard should be had to the fact that the plaintiff was already, as of right, in receipt of nearly half his pay. He ought not to receive compensation twice over. The pension must be taken into account and the damages should be reduced by £18,000 to £14,111 instead of £32,111. The appeal should be allowed. Donovan, L.J., dissenting, said that the ratio of Payne's case covered this case and was not impliedly overruled by Gourley's case, supra, which was concerned with the different question whether account should be taken, not of an asset, but of liability to income tax. The pension here was not payable as compensation for the damage inflicted by a tort but was payable on the occasion of the accident and was not, strictly speaking, compensation for the tort. His lordship would have dismissed the appeal. Diplock, L.J., concurring in allowing the appeal, said that the ratio of Payne's case, supra, was based on the principle that damages for negligence were punitive. The decision in Gourley's case authorita tively settled the principle that such damages were compensatory. Appeal allowed. (Browning v. War Office and another, Solicitors' Journal, November 3Oth, 1962, page 957.) Solicitor's oppressive conduct of litigation—persona/ liability for costs A wife petitioned the Court for a decree of judicial separation on the ground of her husband's cruelty to which an appearance was entered by the husband. Subsequently the husband decided to defend the proceedings and to cross-petition for dissolution, but no answer was filed on his behalf. The wife then obtained a decree of judicial separation, her petition having been set down as an undefended cause. The husband received no notice of the setting down of the petition. This was so held by the Court. On the husband's petition to the Court to reverse the decree on the grounds that he had not had an opportunity to defend the proceedings the wife's solicitor deliberately elected to fight the issue of whether or not the husband had received notice knowing that they could not prove that he had. The Court reversed the decree obtained by the wife under section 14, subsection 3 of the Matrimonial

THE REGISTRY Register C

STUDENT requires Bowen's Statutory Land Purchase, 1928 and Osborne's County Court Practice, 1910. Highest prices offered Box C.iyz. 75