The Gazette 1961 - 64

Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954 new lease—occupation by landlord premises required for. (Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, s. 3o(f)Cg). In Aperbar v. German (1961) 177 Estates Gazette 197 Dankwerts J. held that landlords who in resisting an application for a new lease claimed that they wished to use a restaurant for their business as solicitors had not shown a firm and settled intention to do so as the restaurant premises were unsuitable for their business without reconstruction and they had neither applied for planning permission nor obtained estimates for work to be done. 'Northern Ireland—Vendor and purchaser—specific per formance. In Buckley v. Irwin (1960) N.I. 98, the defendant, who was regarded as a person who would require protection and guidance in carrying out compara– tively simple business affairs, agreed after a casual conversation with the defendant to sell his farm and tractor to him. In an action for specific performance of the agreement or alternatively for damages for breach of contract, McVeigh J. regarded the price agreed as a substantial undervalue but not necessarily as of such nature that without more evidence fraud could be inferred but he refused to make an order for specific performance on the ground that the bargain was unethical and infringed the principles of fairness which a court of equity requires to be observed. Damages for breach of contract were also refused on the ground that an agreement can be rescinded on grounds other than actual fraud and this includes a transaction in which the court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of a legal advantage which he has obtained. Patents and designs—Patent—infringement. (Eire) In Rawls and American Tire Machinery Inc. v. Irish Tyre and Rubber Services (1960) I.R. II, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing a patent granted in respect of an invention for individually re-lugging worn or damaged lugs on the treads of heavy duty or off-the-road tyres. On the question whether, having regard to common general knowledge in the art at the time of the patent, there was any inventive ingenuity in the alleged invention or whether it was a mere workshop improvement, Budd, J. held that for this purpose common general knowledge must be taken as meaning common general know– ledge in the Republic of Ireland and that, as the alleged invention was a commercial success, supplied a want, was widely used and superior to what went before, it was an invention as distinct from a work-

A hire-purchase agreement negotiated by a dealer, D., between a finance company, F., and the hirer, H., provided that H. should take on hire from its owner, F., a second-hand car, paying £125 deposit and 30 monthly hire charges of £14 K)S. id. and finally having an option to purchase for £i. The finance company never saw the car, which had certain apparent minor defects, and which D. agreed to put right. The agreement provided that "No warranty whatsoever is given by (F.) as to the age, state or quality of the goods or as to fitness for any purpose and any implied warranties and conditions are also hereby expressly excluded." The car had so many minor defects that it could not be used on the roads and after about three months from delivery H. rejected the car. F. sued H. for arrears of instalments and damages and H. counterclaimed for the deposit and instalments paid by him as money paid on a consideration which had totally failed. Held that H. was entitled to reject the car because F. was in fundamental breach of the implied condition of fitness and the exception clause did not protect F. Accordingly, F. was not entitled to instalments or damages for any time after rejection, but that the consideration had not totally failed, so that H. was not entitled to recover what he had paid and must pay the instalments down to rejection. Yeoman Credit v. Apps. (1961) 2 All E.R. 281 Court of Appeal (Pearce Harman & Davies L.J.J.). hours supper licence—drink "ancillary" to meal. (Licensing Act, 1953 s. 104 (i) (a).). The descrip– tion in s. 104 (i) (a) of the Licensing Act, 1953, of "premises . bona fide used . . for . . providing . . . substantial refreshment to which the sale of intoxicating liquor is ancillary" for which a supper licence can be granted does not refer to the sale and supply being ancillary to the total business done on the premises, but is a description of the kind of meal or refreshment which the premises must be bona fide intended to be used to provide. In other words, it is descriptive of the meal. It must not be a sale of liquor under the cloak of meals but there must be bona fide meals to which the drink is ancillary. In considering an application by a club for a supper licence, justices, on finding that the total receipts from the sale of drink exceeded those for the sale of meals, held that the drinks were not ancillary to the meals and refused the licence. On an application for mandamus held that it must issue, as, applying the proper test there was, on the facts, no doubt that the provisions of the section were satisfied: R. v. Liverpool Licensing Justices, ex. p. Tynan (1961) i W.L.R. 837; 2 all E.R. 363 Divisional Ct. Intoxicating Liquors Consumption during prohibited