The Gazette 1961 - 64

ment, malicious prosecution and conspiracy against two police constables. Havers J. on the verdict of a jury, entered judgment for the plaintiffs for £5,200. The Times, May 9, 1961. This is known as " The Kiss in the Car Case ". Road Traffic—dangerous driving and careless driving— circumstances in which mechanical defect a defence. In R. v. Spurge (May 18, 1961) the Court of Criminal Appeal (Lord Parker C.J., Hilbery, Gorman, Salmon and Stevenson JJ.) held that if, on a prosecution for dangerous driving, the motor– car endangered the public solely by reason of some sudden overwhelming misfortune suffered by the man at the wheel for which he was in no way to blame, then he was not guilty of dangerous driving. The Times, May i9th, 1961. both parties to sale. In Gavaghan v. Edwards (April 28, 1961) the Court of Appeal (Ormerod, Willmer and Danc- dwerts L.JJ.) held, dismissing an appeal from a county court judge, that the issue whether a solicitor who acted for both parties to a sale could have authority to sign a memorandum on their behalf for the purposes of s. 2 of the Irish Statute of Frauds, 1695, depended on the facts of each particular case : the mere fact of solicitor and client relation– ship did not give the solicitor by implication any authority to sign a memorandum. In Rooks v. Barnard (May 19, 1961) Sachs J. held (i) that the making of threats to induce a man to break a contract where he had no right to do so was tortious; (2) That where individual threats had the cumulative effect of causing damage it was not possible for each individual to say that no one of them had actually caused the damage and con– sequently that no tort had been committed at all; (3) that since the policy of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, was to ensure that employees were as a general rule free to pursue by lawful means the furtherance of trade disputes, it followed that s. 3 should be construed as to avoid giving employees freedom to use in furtherance of a trade dispute means which were of themselves unlawful or in impairment of their obligations. Accordingly, by (i) and (2) a defence based on s. i of the Trade Disputes Act failed, and by (3) a defence based on s. 3 also failed. The Times, May 20, 1961. 29 Solicitors—authority to sign memorandum—acting for Trade Unions—trade dispute inducement to breach of contract—boundaries of law of tort.

submitted by the plaintiffs subject to a reduction in price. On March 8th, 1953, the plaintiffs submitted a revised tender which specified that the works would be completed within 18 months from the date of instructions to proceed. The date for completion of the works in fact inserted in the contract, on the instructions of an official of the defendants, was September 3oth, 1956, giving a period for completion of 30 months. If the tender had been made on the basis of a 30 month period for completion the price would have been higher. The plaintiffs brought an action claiming, inter alia, rectification of the contract. Pennycuick J. held that the plaintiffs in the circumstances were entitled to the relief claimed on the ground that if one party to a transaction knew that the instrument contained a mistake in his favour but did nothing to correct it, he was precluded from resisting rectification because the mistake was merely unilateral and not common (J.A.G.) See also 105 S.J. 425. Criminal Law—sentence—conspiracy to contravene Official Secrets Act, 1911. In R. v. Kroger ; R. v. Kroger ; R. v. Houghton ; R. v. Gee ; R. v. Lonsdale (May 8, 1961) the Court of Criminal Appeal (Hilbery, Pilcher and Paull JJ.) held, dismissing appeals against sentences imposed on a conviction of a common law conspiracy to communicate information, in contravention of s. I of the Official Secrets Act, 1911, that the appropriate sentence for a common law conspiracy was any sentence in the discretion of the court, provided that the sentence was not inordinately long. (D.C.) The Times. Extradition—-fugitive offenders—discharge—discretion. In R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex p. Maranjan Singh (May 5, 1961) the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had committed S. to Brixton Prison to await his return to India on charges under Art. 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The offences were alleged to have been committed in about October, 1951. S. applied for a writ of habeas corpus, applying alternatively under s. 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, principally on the ground of the long delay on the part of the Indian authorities in bringing proceedings. The Divisional Court (Lord Parker C.J., Salmon and Edmund Davies JJ.) held, allowing the application, that that court had a wide discretion under s. 10 of the Act. (D.C.) The Times, May 6,1961. Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment—action against police constables. In Selby v. Maclennan (May 8, 1961) plaintiffs claimed damages for alleged assault, false imprison–