The Gazette 1949-1952

held that the bill was defective under the Rules of the Supreme Court (England) Order 65, Rule 27, but the Court had discretion to permit its withdrawal and re-delivery and it was proper to exercise it in this case in favour of L. Re. A solicitor (1943, I, All England Reports 157). Re. A Solicitor (1936, I, All England Reports, 491). Per Harman J. “ I agree that a solicitor must show a strong case to justify the amendment or withdrawal of a bill o f costs and that the applicant ought to have been alive to the rule as to showing unpaid disbursements separately. I agree also that it would need a very strong case to allow a solicitor to alter his bill so as to increase his charges. The mistake here was, however, merely one of form. No attempt to deceive the clients was made nor is any increased charge sought to be introduced. The clients have largely benefited by the efforts o f their solicitor and Counsel, and it would in my opinion, be a disproportionate punishment of a mere slip if they were to saddle the solicitor personally with these not inconsiderable fees which he has paid. For all these reasons, I propose to exercise my discretion and to allow the bill to be withdrawn and re-delivered. I shall direct the bill, when re-delivered, to be taxed. Tbe terms, therefore, are : tax the clients’ costs of this application and of the application for taxation as between solicitor and client, and order the solicitor to pay them. Subject to their payment within fourteen days of taxation, the solicitor may withdraw his bill and deliver a fresh bill not distinguished from it in any particular save that proper entries may be made in respect o f disbursements and that bill, if and when delivered, should be taxed.” (re. a Solicitor (1931) I, All E. R. 392). Undercutting. Attracting business unfairly The Court dismissed an appeal by Mr. Wilfrid Ariel Evill, a solicitor, from findings and an Order, made on December 1st, 1950, by the Disciplinary Committee of the English Law Society, constituted under the Solicitors’ Acts, whereby it was ordered that Mr. Evill should pay a penalty of £100, for failing to comply with Rules 1 and 2 o f the Solicitors’ Practice Rules, 1936. It was stated that Mr. Evill had no desire for the anonymity to which he was entitled as an appellant to that Court. By Rule I of the Rules o f 1936, “ a solicitor shall not . . . permit in the carrying on of his practice any act . . . which can reasonably be regarded as calculated to attract business unfairly. By Rule 2 “ a solicitor shall not . . . allow himself to be held out . . . as being prepared to do professional business . . . in non-cpntentious

matters . . . at less than two-thirds of the scale o f charges fixed by the regulations contained in the General Order o f 1882, made under the Solicitors’ Remuneration Act, 1881.” Mr. Gilbert Pauli, K .C ., and Mr. Colin Duncan appeared for Mr. E v ill; Mr. C. R. Havers, K.C., and J. R. Cumming-Bruce for the Committee. The Lord Chief Justice, giving judgment, said that the Amalgamated Engineering Union, like some other trade unions, acted like a building society and helped their members to buy houses. Mr. Evill had an arrangement with the union whereby he was to act for them in their capacity as mortgagees and at the same time would charge the prospective purchaser of a house, who would be a member o f the union, far less than would ordinarily be payable. under the established scale o f charges. The arrangement had been made many years previously, and it was clear that a considerable amount o f the business brought to Mr. Evill by the union had been done by him on those terms. He charged the proper fee to the union as mortgagees and then, instead of charging the scale fee to pros­ pective purchasers, he had been charging what was not much more than a nominal fee. The point was simply this : Mr. Evill had been acting in a way which, if he was free so to act, was beneficial so far as the particular member of the trade union was concerned. But the rules were designed not only to protect the clients of solicitors but also to preserve proper standards among solicitors themselves. The case o f a solicitor acting for both parties, a mortgagee and a purchaser, was provided for by the rules ; he received scale aijd a half—not double. Mr. Evill, however, and he (His Lordship) was not suggesting that he had no reason for his attitude, made it clear to the prospective pur­ chaser that he would be charging the union the proper fee for the mortgage and for investigating the title for them; that he would, therefore, not have to investigate the title all over again for the purchaser; and that he would, accordingly, not make the charge for investigating title to the latter because he had not done that work for him. That, however, was not what the relevant rule said : I f Mr. Evill investigated a title, he did so for the purchaser as well as for the mortgagees, even if he did not go through the farce of doing it all over again a Second time. A solicitor acting for both parties owed a duty to both. By Rule 6, o f the General Order of 1882, he ought to charge scale and a half in such a case, and if he said that he would not charge that but only something very much less then- he was, to put it shortly, under