The Gazette 1949-1952

Notwithstanding this case, however, it would seem that a solicitor may be liable for negligence if he omits to safe-guard his client in regard to various matters which may arise after he has received instructions but before the contract has been signed, and not necessarily connected with the title. Town planning and other legislation has imposed so many restrictions on the development o f property that it is difficult to say where the solicitor’s duty ends, and the client’ s duty to safeguard himself begins. Solicitors’ privilege I n Bostock v. Bostock (1950 I. All E .R ., 25), there were cross petitions for divorce on the ground o f alleged desertion. At a certain stage o f the proceedings, the parties and their solicitors met at a conference at which a reconciliation was discussed. Counsel for the husband, at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, tendered evidence o f events which took place at the meeting, but counsel for the wife objected to the evidence being called on the ground that the conversations at the meeting were privileged. There had been no agreement between the parties before the conference that the proceedings would be conducted without prejudice. It was held that what took place at the meeting was not to be taken as without prejudice and, consequently, privileged, in the absence o f a specific declaration to that effect, and the evidence tendered was admissible. DECISIONS AFFECTING THE PROFESSION B eeston & S tapleford U.D.C. v . S mith L ocal A uthority . U nqualified clerk DRAWING MORTGAGE M ortgagor ’ s liability for costs B efore the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Humphreys, and Mr. Justice Finnemore. A Divisional Court, on an appeal by way of case stated, affirmed on different grounds, the decision of Nottingham justices convicting Beeston and Stapleford Urban District Council and Mr. Charles Harold Wragg, the clerk o f the council, o f an offence against section 47 o f the Solicitors Act, 1932. At a Court o f summary jurisdiction sitting at Nottingham informations were preferred by the

respondent, Mr. Robert James Tull Smith, a solicitor acting on behalf of the Law Society under section 47 o f the Solicitors Act, 1932, as amended by section 23 o f the Solicitors Act, 1941, against the appellant urban district council and the appellant, Mr. Wragg, their clerk. The Council were charged on each of four informations with having, although not a barrister or duly certificated solicitor, law agent, writer to the signet, notary public, conveyancer, special pleader, or draftsman in equity, either directly or indirectly prepared a mortgage deed relating to a mortgage by a named person. The clerk was on the same facts charged on four informa­ tions with drawing a mortgage deed, also contrary to section 47 o f the Act o f 1932 as amended by section 23 o f the Act o f 1941. At the hearing o f the informations the following facts, inter alia , were proved or admitted :— The clerk received a salary from the council. The council had passed a resolution undertaking to act under the Small Dwellings Acquisition Act, 1899. By section 2 o f that Act the council had to be satisfied that the title to property on which they proposed to make an advance was one which an ordinary mortgagee would be willing to accept, and that the repayment o f the advance was secured by an instrument vesting the property in the council, subject to the right o f redemption. In December, 1946, the council resolved to under­ take investigation o f title and preparation of mortgages themselves, and decided that it should be done by their clerk. In 1947 four advances were made to residents, and the mortgages were pre­ pared by the clerk, for which work a bill was in each case rendered. Sums thus paid to the council by mortgagors were credited to the council’s general rate fund. For the clerk and the council it was contended, inter alia, that they had not acted for fee, gain, or reward, and so were within the proviso to section 47 o f the Act o f 1932 ; and that the clerk was a public officer drawing or preparing instruments in the course o f his duty within the meaning o f section 47 (3) so that section 47 (1) did not apply to him. The justices held that the clerk and the council were acting ultra vires , and they accordingly con­ victed them and fined them 10s. each on each of the informations. They further held that the clerk was a public officer and that, had he not been acting ultra vires, they would therefore have dismissed the informations. The council and their clerk appealed. The Lord Chief Justice giving judgment, said 56