The Gazette 1949-1952

that the justices’ decision that the charge made to the mortgagors was ultra vires was clearly wrong, and Mr. Pauli, for the prosecutor, had not sought to support it. It was argued for the council and their clerk that they had not acted for fee, gain or reward because what the mortgagors paid went into the general rate fund. The Court could not accept that contention. The council were “ a person ” within the meaning of section 47 (1) o f the Act o f 1932, and could only act by their officer. They had acted for a fee because they had made a charge which the mortgagors had had to pay. The only real point in the case was whether or not the clerk was a “ public officer.” Different meanings could be given to those words according to the statutes in which they occurred. The question was whether “ public officer ” in section 47 (3) of the Act o f 1932 referred to any clerk of a local authority or must be interpreted more narrowly as referring to an officer in a public department. The object o f the Act o f 1932 was to ensure that conveyancing matters were carried out by qualified persons, and the Court ought accordingly not to give the words “ public officer ” a very wide interpretation since that would open the door to preparation o f mortgage instruments and so forth by a large number o f unqualified persons. The officers meant by the words “ public officer ” in the Act o f 1932 were officers in a department of State or a public department set up by statute, officers whose salary was chargeable to national as distinct from local funds. The justices had been wrong on both points, though they had arrived at the right results. The appeal would be dismissed. Mr. Justice Humphreys and Mr. Justice Finnemore agreed. (65 T .L .R . 134) V P acey v. A tkinson D ebt collecting . U nqualified person acting IN EXPECTATION OF FEE OR REWARD Before the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Lynskey and Mr. Justice Sellers. The Court allowed the appeal, by case stated, of Mr. Frederick William Beston Pacey, acting on behalf o f the Law Society, from the decision of Darlington justices dismissing six informations preferred against the respondent. Mr. Victor Cecil Atkinson, charging him with offences under section

47 (1) of the Solicitors Act, 1932, as amended by the Solicitors Act, 1941. The information preferred against the respondent charged that contrary to the section, he, “ not being a barrister or a duly certificated solicitor, solicitor in Scotland, writer to the signet, notary public, conveyancer, special pleader, or draftsman in equity, drew, or, alternatively, prepared, an instrument in relation to a legal proceeding for or in expectation o f a fee, gain or reward.” The respondent, who was not qualified under the section, was a rent and debt collector. He carried on business in Darlington, and was employed by creditors and landlords to collect sums due to them, and had authority from his principals to institute and carry through proceedings in the Darlington County Court for the recovery o f sums due. He was remunerated by a payment o f i\% on the sums which he collected. In the case referred to in the informations he had drafted particulars o f claim in county court proceedings, and received or expected to receive z\ per cent, o f the sums recovered whether the proceedings were heard in Court or not. Apart from his agreed remuneration he neither received nor expected to receive any reward for drawing or preparing particulars of claim, or for any work in connection with the proceedings or for attendance in Court. No objection had ever been taken to the procedure which he followed. The justices were o f opinion that the respondent had drawn the instruments relating to a legal proceeding specified in the informations, but a majority were satisfied that he did not do it directly or indirectly for or in expectation o f any fee, gain or reward. They accordingly dismissed all the informations. The Lord Chief Justice, in delivering the judgment o f the Court, said that the evidence to the effect that no objection had been taken by the county court judge or the registrar to the practice followed by the respondent was quite irrelevant. Whatever practice might have existed the only question was whatever the respondent’s action was prohibited by the statute. A t the same time it was well known that the practice had existed in all parts of the country and the question was one, therefore, o f considerable importance, not only to rent and debt collectors, but to the owners o f property who employed them and who, if the statute prohibited collectors from taking proceedings in the county court on behalf o f their principals, would have either to do the 57