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island. On the other hand, normalization of relations with the United States exposed Castro’s regime to internal political pres- sures. No longer could the regime credibly lay its failures at Washington’s door; it would instead have to own those failures. In addition, the loss of the United States as an enemy meant the loss of an important rationale the regime used to justify its authoritarian rule. President Obama emphasized that point in a half-hour speech he delivered from Havana’s historic Gran Teatro, or Grand Theater. “I believe my visit here demonstrates that you do not need to fear a threat from the United States,” the presi- dent declared, addressing Raúl Castro directly. “And . . . I’m also confident that you need not fear the different voices of the Cuban people and their capacity to speak and assemble and vote for their leaders.” As Obama issued that challenge—and as he chided the Cuban regime at other points in his speech—Castro and his inner circle sat stone-faced. Ordinarily, Cubans don’t see their leaders in an even mildly unflattering light, as the state main- tains tight control over the media. But Obama’s speech was broadcast live across the island. In the days and weeks following Obama’s visit, many Cuban officials lashed out at the American president. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez, for example, blasted Obama’s Cuba trip as “a deep attack on our political ideas, our history, our cul- ture and our symbols.” But the questions remained: Where would Raúl Castro’s reforms ultimately lead? Could the regime open up Cuba’s economy, and embrace closer ties with the United States, while

Turbulent Times

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