U Magazine , Fall 1985

it is known in the USSR) ironically led to the legitimation of the Communist party and to the potential for the Soviet Union to act as a great power in world politics. The losses of World War II and Stalin's brutal use of the secret police kept the Soviet Union weak. however. His death in 1953 unleashed many attempts to correct his mistakes. but his era was so significant that no one in the Com– munist party could even visualize how to return the country to the paths and choices of a pre-Stalin era. The Khrushchev years of the late 1950s and early 1960s removed much of the crude terrorism of the secret police while reducing Soviet political isolation in the international political system. But Khrushchev's frequent reorganizations and the high risk foreign policy games he played were gree ted with dismay in the party. Khrushchev's gyrations, although not as personally threatening as Stalin's, still frightened many in the Communist party, and he was over– thrown in a bloodless coup by Brezhnev in 1964. The Brezhnev years corrected the Khrushchev years; Brezhnev brought stability to party personnel policy and stopped the frequent reorga nizations of the party a pparatus. His regime spon– sored a 10-year military build-up to com– pensate for the weaknesses demon– strated in the Cuban missile crisis. Brezhnev entered into arms control agreements to regularize and stabilize the strategic rivalry with the United States. And his years saw an immense investment in Soviet agriculture and serious efforts to increase living stan– dards for unskilled workers and collec– tive and state farmers. But the last years of the Brezhnev era were filled with frustration. Despite a 10-year military build-up, the United States and its allies (now including China) were still militarily strong and could be expected to respond effectively in any arms race. Soviet economic growth was slowing. and Brezhnev's commitment to a stable personnel policy prevented reorganization. Finally, a workers' revolt against Communist rule threatened the Soviet position in Poland and throughout central Europe while a weak Afghan client state was drawing the Soviet military into a frustrating war against Islamic insurgents.

There was a sigh of relief in the Soviet Union when Brezhnev died in 1982. Andropov. the new leader, seemed dynamic and committed to energizing the party with new blood. One of his first moves was to encourage a young lawyer from the Stavropol region by provid ing him with important posts in the ruling Politburo and party secretariat. That man , of course, was Gorbachev, and Andropov's cho ice was significant because his health failed quickly. Andropov died before his personnel shakeups had made much difference, but the Soviet economy did rebound temporarily as productivity responded favorably to anti-corruption campaigns. Andropov's death gave pause to Soviet citizens. but the announcement of his replacement. Chernenko. brought a feel– ing of dismay to both them and also reform groups in the party. Chernenko was old and had been tied closely to Brezhnev. The prospects for change which had been encouraged by Andropov were frustrated but could not be eliminated. Chernenko's short regime gave time for Gorbachev to consolidate his position and gain foreign policy experience. When Chernenko died in early 1985, Gorbachev took control quickly. He has brought new blood into the ruling Polit– buro while eliminating potential rivals like Romanov, the Leningrad party leader with close ties to the military. Gorbachev, then, is in excellent posi– tion to further consolidate his control over the next several years. At 54, he has the potential to establish a political era in Soviet politics as only two have done before him. What might that era look like? Gorbachev is a product of post– Stalinism. He was too young to have fought in the Great Patriotic War, and his political career did not begin until after Stalin's death. Although it is hard to generalize about a generation. we do know that Gorbachev's cohorts are aware of the ferment and excitement of the Khrushchev era. There will be yearnings for economic experi– mentation , but also the wisdom to avoid the chaos of Khrushchev. The economic choices facing Gorbachev are not pleasant. Declining growth rates. low productivity, labor shortages, con– struction delays. and rampant bureauc-

Brezhnev brought stability to party personnel policy and stopped the frequent reorgani– zations of the party apparatus.

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