CBA Record

Y O U N G L A W Y E R S J O U R N A L

On remand, Cummings noted that Rodriguez only authorized “ordinary inqui- ries” during a traffic stop. And, Cummings argued, the officer was not conducting an “ordinary inquiry” when he asked for Cum- mings’ license because the officer did not pull Cummings over for a traffic violation. In other words, because this was not an ordi- nary traffic stop, the “ordinary inquiries” of an ordinary traffic stop—such as checking to see if the driver had a license—would not apply. Cummings argued that, once the officer saw that he was not Chattic, there were no inquiries left to be made as a part of the stop, since the officer’s only reason for pulling over the van was that he believed Chattic was the driver. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, citing Rodriguez ’s express reference to a driver’s license check as an “ordinary inquiry” of a stop. And, the court stated, such an inquiry cannot unreasonably pro- long a stop because the inquiry is automati- cally part of the mission of any traffic stop. That is so even if, as in Cummings’ case, the police did not pull over the driver for a traffic offense. The court determined that a police officer’s interest in safety during the traffic stop justified the check for a driver’s license even though the officer’s reasonable suspicion “vanished upon seeing” Cum- mings. Applying Rodriguez and Cummings II Understanding the contours of Cummings II and Rodriguez requires an examination of the possible situations in which they would apply. The first example arises when an officer pulls over a driver for some kind of traffic violation (e.g., speeding, failure to signal when changing lanes, etc.). During the stop, the officer can take the time to write a ticket and to perform the “ordinary inquiries” listed in Rodriguez —check the driver’s registration, proof of insurance, driv- er’s license, and any outstanding warrants. It is important to note that, during the time the officer needs to issue the ticket and conduct the “ordinary inquiries,” he or she may also investigate other matters, even if they have nothing to do with the original reason for the traffic stop. For example, if two police officers conducted the stop

But the Court in Rodriguez added that, beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, a police officer’s mission during a routine traffic stop includes “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop.” And the Court listed several examples of “ordinary inquiries”: checking the driver’s license, determining whether the driver has outstanding warrants, checking the car’s registration, and making sure the driver has proof of insurance. The Court justified the performance of these inquiries on the basis that the police should be able to ensure that the person they are encountering is not dan- gerous or operating the car illegally. In other words, an officer’s interest in safely perform- ing the traffic stop allows them to perform these inquiries. With respect to the specific case before the Court, however, the Court held that the officer unreasonably prolonged the stop because performing a dog sniff went beyond “the officer’s traffic mission.” The State appealed the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Cummings I to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it remained pending during the Court’s consideration of Rodriguez . After deciding Rodriguez , the Court remanded to the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider Cummings 1 in light of Rodriguez . People v. Cummings, 2016 IL 115769 (Cummings II)

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