The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 7

In times of crises, adaptive innovation tends to come to a standstill as short-term

incremental changes are made to recover quickly from impending disaster. In other words,

organisations cannot afford lengthy periods of innovation when faced with imminent

catastrophe. Hence, only incremental changes may be carried out to avoid and reduce

operational downtime.

In this respect of being able to innovate, organisations require sufficient “space” (e.g.

time) to innovate, implement and operationalise innovations; this “space” (and the desire to

innovate) is what the Germans had between 1918 and 1940. Post 1940, the constant

pressure of the Allies stifled Germans’ ability to radically rethink their approach.

Thus, being stripped of “space” to innovate, the Germans could at least have

incrementally optimised their ways of working, adapting their approach to resilience to the

emerging threat at the western and eastern fronts (see Table 7.4).

At its best

Signs of weakness

Germany, post-1940

Performance improvement –

Lack of novel ideas on how to

Rigid thinking, driven by

“do what we do better”

“do better things”

“proven” methods applied

during the Polish and French

Known solutions are

Overconfidence in “best

campaign in 1939/1940.

implemented quickly – even by

practice; viewpoints of non-

edict

experts are excluded

A clear sense of direction,

People’s individual identities

goals, roles and responsibilities

and motives are at odds with

the organizational goals

A strong individual leader who

Lack of leadership at all levels;

people can relate to

lack of devolved ownership

and responsibility

Table 7.4: Performance optimisation: at its best; signs of weakness; Germany post-1940 (Adapted from Denyer 2017)

In technological terms, the Germans incrementally optimised their machines and

material, but gradually lost the advantage to the Russians and Western Allies. In 1940, their

doctrinal approach and technological advantage over the French were staggering. The

erosion of this advantage, though, was driven by an illusory overconfidence that what

worked in the past will work as well in the future. This rigidity in thinking came to a climax in

the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. The Allies innovated and optimised their doctrinal thinking,

the Germans did not; due to overconfidence in their capabilities and the lack of “space” that

would have allowed them to innovate and optimise.

The erosion of adaptive innovation and performance optimisation goes hand in hand

with an erosion of mindful action (see Table 7.5); the erosion of a single approach to

resilience tends not to happen in isolation but in conjunction with remaining approaches to

resilience.

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