CYIL vol. 9 (2018)

JIŘÍ MULÁK CYIL 9 ȍ2018Ȏ process with its importance” , and “ more consequences or rules concerning the position of the person charged and the process operation .” 40 imply from it. In this context it is possible to identify three approaches to this principle in the field of science, namely as a legal presumption, as a part of evidentiary law and as a basic principle of criminal proceedings. 41 Presumption of innocence is not a sole requirement ordering that the person charged should be treated as innocent until found guilty by a court in an authoritative way for his conduct which is deemed criminal by the law. The presumption of innocence goes much deeper. It interferes in the structure of the taking of evidence and evaluation of evidence. This approach requires that from detention of the suspected person or from execution of urgent or non-recurring tasks or from commencement of the criminal prosecution until the final conviction of the person charged the objective legal state is applied, consisting in the fact that the person in question is perceived as innocent. While a final judgement of conviction disproves the presumption of innocence, a final acquitting judgement (or the final resolution on discontinuation of prosecution) confirms the presumption of innocence. According to the European Court of Human Rights, the applicability of ratione temporis – Art. 6(2) of the ECHR can be, under certain circumstances, almost time-unlimited because it is not limited just to the criminal proceedings that are underway, but it can be extended even to judicial decisions issued after discontinuation of prosecution, 42 or after the claimant was exonerated from accusation, 43 in the extent in which the issues raised in these matters represent a consequence or complement of the concerned criminal proceedings in which the claimant was the person charged. 44 After the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings, only protection of honour and reputation of the former person charged, who is reproached, in an unjustified way, for committing a criminal offence can be taken into consideration. 45 The presumption of innocence contains various aspects which are typical of some other principles as well. The definition of this principle in the ECHR or in the ICCPR contains the requirement of legitimacy (Section 2(1) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure). From the perceiving of the person charged as an innocent person, for whom the inadequate length of the proceedings is surely undesirable and many times highly stressing it is possible to derive the necessity of the rapid course of the criminal proceedings (Section 2(4) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure), as well as of the requirements of adequacy and moderation 41 Also the Twelfth International Congress of Penal Law in Hamburg (1979) was aware of the multidimensional nature of this principle and in its resolution it stated that the presumption of innocence principle consists, among other things, of 1) Nobody can be sentenced or declared guilty in a legal form until criminal proceedings were conducted against him in a legal way; 2) No sentence or equivalent sanction can be imposed on anybody unless he was found guilty in accordance with the law; 3) Nobody can be required to prove his innocence; 4) In the case of doubts the final decision must be made in favour of the person charged. 42 Decision of the European Court of Human Rights, Minelli v. Switzerland, application no. 8660/79, of 25 March 1983; Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany, application no. 10300/83, of 25 August 1987. 43 Decision of the European Court of Human Rights Sekanina v. Austria , application no. 13126/87, of 25 August 1993; Lamanna v. Austria , application no. 28923/95, of 10 July 2001; Leutscher v. the Netherlands , application no. 17314/90, of 26 March 1996; Del Latte v. the Netherlands , application, no. 44760/98, of 9 November 2004. 44 Decision of the European Court of Human Rights, Moullet v. France , application no. 27521/0, of 13 Septem- ber 2007. 45 REPÍK, Bohumil. Evropská úmluva o lidských právech a trestní právo , op. cit., p. 179. 40 REPÍK, Bohumil. Evropská úmluva o lidských právech a trestní právo. (“European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Law”). Prague: Orac, 2002, p. 176.

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