The Gazette 1974

'[ff than by the Corporation, Mr. Justice Henchy said toe function of the inspector holding the inquiry was make a fair and accurate report of what took place. At was for the Minister to reach his own decision unfettered by any conclusion the inspector might have c ome to, but on the basis of the same evidential mate- n al as was before the inspector. Inspector's advice not to confirm order rejected by Minister It had been contended on behalf of Mr. Murphy that toe Minister would not have confirmed the compulsory Purchase order if he had followed the inspector's con- clusion of fact. The inspector recommended that the Minister be not advised to confirm the compulsory pur- chase order because the Corporation had failed to prove mat their acquisition was essential to, or even the most ex pedient way of securing the speedy erection of new Nouses. The gist of counsel's argument for Mr. Murphy that the Minister had obviously rejected this finding Ny the inspector; that he had done so without evidence a n d in the teeth of the evidence given at the inquiry, ar >d that, therefore, the Minister's confirmation of the 0r der should be invalidated. Mr. Justice Henchy said that in his opinion this argu- ment failed because it was based on a false premise. . ' had assumed that the Minister had rejected the Mspector's finding that the compulsory acquisition was Not essential to, or the most expedient way of securing toe speedy erection of new houses. But the fact that the Minister confirmed the compulsory purchase order did N°t mean that he disagreed with that finding. Even if agreed fully with it, he would still have been entitled t o confirm the order because since the land was being tompulsorily acquired, all he had to be satisfied of was Nat it was being acquired for the purpose of the Act a n d that the provisions in the third schedule to the j t had been complied with. To be satisfied on either m those counts it was not necessary for him to be satis- e d that the land was wanted for, or would lead to the s peedy erection of new houses was envisaged as a hous-

ing purpose in certain cases—to eliminate overcrowding —the Act enabled housing authorities to take a longer view. Apart from acquiring compulsorily land to be immedi- ately used for the purposes of the Act they were em- powered to acquire compulsorily land not so required "provided that the Minister is of opinion that there is reasonable expectation that the land will be required by the housing authority in the future in order to attain any of the objectives to which they are required by Subsection (3) of Section 55 of this Act to have regard in preparing a building programme". Fallacious to treat inquiry as contest between Corpora- tion and Plaintiff The Judge added that as pointed out by the Presi- dent of the High Court it was fallacious to treat the public inquiry as a contest between the Corporation and the plaintiff as to which would be allowed to build houses on the plaintiff's land, with victory to be accor- ded by the Minister to whichever of them could do so more speedily. Once there was either (a) evidence that the land was required by the Corporation immediately for the purposes of the Act or (b) evidence enabling the Minister to form the opinion that there was a reason- able expectation that the Corporation would require it in the future in order to attain any of the objectives set out in Section 55 (3), the Minister was entitled to con- firm the compulsory purchase order. Neither in the High Court, nor on the appeal, had it been suggested that such evidence was wanting. While the criticism could be made—and was made—that the land was not required for the immediate building of houses on it, there was undisputed evidence that the Corporation would use it in the future for the "provision of ade- quate housing accommodation to meet needs arising from the obsolescence of dwellings or the prospective increase in the population", which was one of the objec- tives of the Act. [Murphy v. Dublin Corporation (No. 2); Full Sup- reme Court; per Henchy J.; unreported; 5 April 1974.]

DISALLOWANCE OF COUNSEL S FEES ON TAXATION RESTORED — PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE STATED BY MR. JUSTICE GANNON

In this action the plaintiff claimed damages for per- sonal injuries which he sustained in an accident in 1968 ! 0 r which the defendant accepted liability and the only tesue for determination in the action was the nature of toe plaintiff's injuries and the amount of damages w hich should be awarded. Before the conclusion of the evidence on the second . a V of the hearing the parties reached a compromise. A Judgment was entered by consent before Mr. Justice Murnaghan for a sum of £16,000 with costs to be toxed. The taxation of costs proceeded before the Tax- tog Master in due course and as a consequence of a

number of disallowances objections were lodged on behalf of the solicitor for the plaintiff on the 24th March 1972. The objections related only to a number of items in respect of the disallowance of disbursements made by the solicitor for the plaintiff in respect of fees to counsel. These items are numbered 39, 67, 70, 73, 75, 77, 83, 86 and 89 on the plaintiff's solicitor's bill of costs and relate to such disbursements. The grounds of objection to the disallowances were stated in very wide and vague terms. Mr. Mackey submitted that in determining whether allowances were proper or not and in the determina- 100