The Gazette 1974

out in respect of this item that an error was made on the bill of costs at this item and that the full 12 guineas claimed by the solicitor was intended by the Taxing Master to be allowed. In regard to the items Numbers 75 and 77 on the bill of costs which are concerned with the disallowances of disbursements for fees to counsel for a consultation held prior to the advising of proofs it appears to me that Mr. Mackey is correct in his contention that the Taxing Master misunderstood the nature of the matter and the purpose of this consultation and appeared to determined the allowances by rule of thumb. Reference to pages 15 to 18 of the bill of costs shows that there were special considerations and unusual circumstances relating them to the matter of the plaintiffs' own plead- ings and not merely to a consideration of the defence de- livered with a lodgment. It is evident that the plaintiff's own circumstances had changed in a serious manner by reason of his injuries and the nature of the matter to be stated in the pleadings was a matter of technical nature which required special consideration in relation to which assistance of medical experts was required and obtained. In these circumstances it appears to me that the Taxing Master was in error in disallowing the amounts of such disbursements to the extent to which he did so. Accordingly in respect of item 75 I would con- sider the appropriate disallowance in respect of this item should be £4.20 and in respect of item 77 the correct disallowance should be £2.10. The remaining items relate to the disbursements of fees for briefs for counsel and of fees for refreshers. In reference to these the Taxing Master in his report says : "In measuring these fees at the taxation I had special regard to the nature of the case, the pleadings, the directions of learned senior counsel in his advice on proofs, the duration of the case, the size, extent and the value of the damages awarded by the Court to the plaintiff, the importance of the subject matter of the action for the parties concerned and in particular for the plaintiff. I took the view that it was a case where it was reasonable for the solicitor to have briefed two senior counsel and that the brief fee of £52.50 allowed to each of them and the refresher fee of £21 allowed to each of them was fair and reasonable. "I noted that the cause of action arose on or about 7 July 1968, that the originating plenary summons was issued on 3 April 1969 and that the action was disposed of by the Honourable Court in November 1971. "On the hearing of the objections it was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that while the trial of the action was confined to the issue of damages only that the plaintiff's injuries were of a serious nature and that apart from the other witnesses hereinbefore mentioned counsel had to concern themselves with the evidence of two surgeons, an eye specialist and a dentist who dealt with the different aspects of the injuries from which the plaintiff was alleged to have been suffering. I noted, however, that the dentist did not attend Court as a witness. On reconsidering the entire circumstances of the case I felt that the fee on brief to each of the senior counsel should be increased to 60 guineas with an appropriate fee for junior counsel and I so ruled. I took the view that the refreshers should also be increased and having regard to what was urged in this regard and taking all the circumstances of the case into considera- tion that the refreshers to each of the two senior counsel should be increased to 30 guineas and with an appro- priate increase to junior counsel and I so ruled." 100

rules to be found in the judgment of Kenny J. in Davan v. Walshe (Number 2), 1967, I.R. 129. Accord- ln gly, as Kenny J. did in that case, I propose in this matter before me to reconsider the matter of these dis- allowances on the taxation before the Taxing Master, all which are concerned only with disbursements of fees to counsel. In doing so I have regard to the fact that the Taxing Master is very experienced in this work and Particularly qualified by his previous practice as a soli- ctor for that function. I appreciate therefore the con- siderable assistance I have received from counsel for both parties on this motion and the care taken to put before me by way of evidence matters pertinent to my consideration which had not been so fully presented to fhe Taxing Master. On the matter of the depreciation •n the value of money insofar as it may be considered a Pertinent factor I have had some evidence which was JJ°t before the Taxing Master. The evidence before me has clearly demonstrated that the continuing and accelerating depreciation in the value of money is a matter of real significance to the solicitor in practice today in every aspect of his work. I am satisfied that 'He practising solicitor in contemplating the "hypothe- hcal counsel" with a view to assessing the reasonable fee which he would be content to take would have regard instinctively if not deliberately to the depreci- ation in the value of money. As correctly pointed out by Mr. O'Shaughnessy this is not a factor which can or should be measured by any purported scale of percen- ' a ges taken from statistics, nor is it capable of measure- ment with any degree of precision. Nevertheless, it is Part of the reality of the daily life of the reasonable s °licitor in his everyday practice. I accept as correct 'He submission by Mr. Mackey that the Taxing Master may not only be guided by his own previous experience a s a solicitor but must also keep himself informed of 'he practices of solicitors in up to date circumstances as t o what is reasonable and that he should have regard the practices of barristers in marking fees insofar as ac cepted by solicitors in practice. Although Mr. Mackey has suggested that for the purpose of so keeping himself mformed the Taxing Master should have reference to 'he scales of fees adopted by the bar in general meeting f °r High Court and Circuit Court work and to the Sc ale of allowances in respect of counsels' fees in the refes of the Circuit Court and also to the fees paid to bis own counsel by the solicitor opposing the costs on ' a xation, I do not think it necessary or appropriate that 1 should outline or limit in any way the manner in ^hich the Taxing Master should keep himself informed U P to date of the standards of solicitors in practice. It is ^ential, however, to bear in mind that the Taxing Master adopts the standard of the practising solicitor ^ho is reasonably careful and reasonably prudent rather 'Han that he purport himself to prescribe the standards *hich he requires solicitors to adopt. I will now endeavour myself to apply this standard to 'be consideration of the items on the bill of costs before ree in relation to which the disallowances of the Taxing Master are challenged. The first item is Number 39 being a disbursement of 12 guineas to senior counsel ° r advices of proofs. Although the bill of costs appears show a disallowance of 2 guineas, which in the Phrase used in Robb v. Connor , I.R. 9 Eq. 373, would be "clipping" or "shaving" fees, it appears from the report of the Taxing Master that at each stage of the ' a xation he considered 12 guineas a reasonable disburse- ment under this heading. Accordingly it suffices to point