The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter 5

An attack by Panzer IIs and IIIs near Gembloux on 14th/15th May. (BArch, n.d.)

The Germans became disconcerted at seeing their tank rounds bounce off the heavy

Chart-B1s and even the medium Somuas. They noticed that French had their own Achilles’

heel, too. Their tanks did not attack in force but tended to move in loose formations. French

gunnery was revealed as imprecise and lacking coordination, due to fact that the role of

French tank commanders involved aiming, reloading and commanding their tank crews.

Hence, the Germans were allowed to close and aim their guns at weak points, such as the

air intake of the Char-B1.

In the south, the situation remained precarious. German forces crossed the river Meuse

in force at Dinant, Monthermé and Sedan. Counter-attacks by French armoured divisions

were finally launched against the still vulnerable German bridgeheads, but to little avail:

About ten o’clock this morning Colonel de Villelume told us of the collapse of the army

which was defending the Meuse between Sedan and Namur. Eight or nine divisions

were in full retreat. The position is the more serious in that our armies in the north have

not yet begun to fall back. We have a dozen divisions there without counting the English

and the Belgians.

The Prime Minister was unwilling to telephone direct to General Gamelin in order to

avoid a breach with M. Daladier, who is hypersensitive in matters of this sort. He

therefore rang up Daladier to ask him what were Gamelin’s counter-measures, to which

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