The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter 5

Armoured Division, and shortly after the 9 th Infantry Division. By October 19th 1944, the 9 th Infantry

Division alone suffered 4.500 casualties in the light of stiffening German resistance.

On October 21 st , the 28 th Infantry division, commandeered by Major General Cota , was to relive

the embattled 9 th Infantry Division. When Cota received his orders, he was stunned. In detail, the

orders set out that the his three regiments were to attack three separate objectives: the 109 th Infantry

division to push north towards Hürtgen, the 112 th to carry out the main attack through Vossenack,

cross the Kall river gorge and capture Schmidt with its road intersections. Finally, the 110 th Infantry

division was to drive southwards to prevent the Germans form counterattacking and taking control

over the road networks leading to Schmidt. It was a very similar attack that was unsuccessfully carried

out by the 9 th Infantry Division.

On November 2 nd , the attack was launched with a preparatory 60-minute artillery barrage into the

Hürtgen forest. The three regiments moved towards their objectives, in full view of artillery observers

on the Brandenberg and Bergstein ridge. Well directed artillery shells rained down on the 28 th , and all

three regiments started to have casualties. Well entrenched Germans slowed down the progress

through the thickly forested area of the Hürtgen forest. Deteriorating weather stopped all aerial

support, so much of the fighting was carried out by infantry in close quarters.

At the end of November 2 nd , the Americans paid a terrible blood tool, but captured Vossenack,

Kommerscheidt and Schmidt with a battalion size force in each of these villages. Cota remained most

his time in his divisional headquarters, jubilant at the capture of Schmidt. However, he was oblivious

of the state of his regiments. His troops were exhausted, little or no effort was made to send out

patrols, or to dug-in in anticipation of a counterattack by the Germans. To make matters worse, the

supply route through the Kall Trail came to a standstill. The first M10 tank destroyers, bound to

Kommerscheidt and Schmidt threw their tracks on the narrowly winding Kall trail, or were disabled by

mines. It would remain blocked until November 5 th .

On November 3 rd , the Germans – as expected – would counterattack, with a force of Pzkpfw III,

IV and V (Panthers). The beleaguered American defenders, under constant artillery fire, had not been

supplied with anti-tank guns nor has made any tank or tank destroyer made it to Schmidt. The

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