PJC Business 2024

PJC 109.1

C IVIL C ONSPIRACY

R. Civ. P. 277; see Thota v. Young , 366 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. 2012) (rule 277’s use of “whenever feasible” mandates broad-form submission in any or every instance in which it is capable of being accomplished). For further discussion, see PJC 116.2 regarding broad-form issues and the Casteel doctrine. Knowledge, intent, and agreement. To be liable for conspiracy, a party must be shown to have intended to do more than engage in the conduct that resulted in the injury. It must be shown that from the inception of the combination or agreement the party intended to cause the injury or was aware of the harm likely to result from the wrongful conduct. First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker , 514 S.W.3d 214, 222 (Tex. 2017); Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Riley , 900 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex. 1995); Great National Life Insurance Co. v. Chapa , 377 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1964). Thus, a party must be shown to have known the object and purpose of the conspiracy and to have had a meeting of the minds with the other conspirators to accomplish that object and purpose, intending to bring about the resulting injury. First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont , 514 S.W.3d at 222; ERI Consulting Engi neers, Inc. v. Swinnea , 318 S.W.3d 867, 881 (Tex. 2010); Schlumberger Well Survey ing Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp. , 435 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tex. 1968). Unlawful act. A defendant’s liability for conspiracy is based on participation in the statutory violation or underlying tort (other than negligence) that would have been actionable against at least one of the conspirators individually. Tilton v. Marshall , 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996); International Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Holloway , 368 S.W.2d 567, 581 (Tex. 1963). An act or declaration by a conspirator not in pursu ance of the common objective is not actionable against coconspirators. Chapa , 377 S.W.2d at 635. Likewise, an improper motive in performing a lawful action will not support liability for conspiracy. Kingsbery v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 315 S.W.2d 561, 576 (Tex. App.—Austin 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The injury must have been caused by the tort or statutory violation that the conspirator agreed with the perpetrator to bring about while intending the resulting harm. Triplex Communications, Inc. , 900 S.W.2d at 720; Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. , 435 S.W.2d at 857. Once a civil conspiracy is found, each coconspirator is responsible for the actions of any coconspirator in fur therance of the conspiracy. Thus, each element of the underlying tort or violation is imputed to each participant. Akin v. Dahl , 661 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex. 1983). Conspiracy to accomplish lawful objective by unlawful means. PJC 109.1 sub mits the proper question if a court or jury has established the existence of an unlawful objective, that is, a statutory violation or a tort (other than negligence). The supreme court’s opinions regarding conspiracy also define a conspiracy cause of action arising when the conspirators pursue a lawful objective by unlawful means. First United Pen tecostal Church of Beaumont , 514 S.W.3d at 222; Triplex Communications, Inc. , 900 S.W.2d at 719; Chapa , 377 S.W.2d at 635. The Committee believes PJC 109.1 can be used to submit either theory but that it may need modification in some instances depending on the facts of the case.

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