PJC Business 2024

D EFAMATION , B USINESS D ISPARAGEMENT & I NVASION OF P RIVACY

PJC 110.1

PJC 110.1 Libel and Slander (Comment on Broad Form) Explanatory note. Chapter 110 governs submission of libel and slander cases. The following general comments should be considered when using the pattern submis sions in chapter 110. Libel and slander distinguished. Defamation includes both libel and slander. Libel is a publication by writing or some other graphic means (including broadcast ing). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §73.001; Neely v. Wilson , 418 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. 2013) (“[T]he broadcasting of defamatory statements read from a script is libel rather than slander.”). Slander is orally communicated defamatory words. Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson , 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995). Libel in Texas, when the common law still prevailed, was codified in a statute, now Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§73.001–.006. Slander remains controlled by the common law, subject to con stitutional standards in an appropriate case. Cain v. Hearst Corp. , 878 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1994). Broad-form submission. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 requires that “the court shall, when ever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form questions.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 277; see Thota v. Young , 366 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. 2012) (rule 277’s use of “whenever feasi ble” mandates broad-form submission in any or every instance in which it is capable of being accomplished). But defamation claims involve multiple elements and defenses, all of which may not apply to every case, and many publications give rise to multiple allegedly defamatory statements. That many defamation cases involve consti tutional issues further complicates the trial court’s task in crafting a jury charge. The questions and instructions in chapter 110 assume as their subject a single allegedly defamatory statement and provide patterns from which to select those ele ments or defenses that apply in a particular case. Broad-form submission, however, may be feasible in some cases, and the questions and instructions in chapter 110 may be combined as appropriate. Compare McFarland v. Boisseau , 365 S.W.3d 449, 452– 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (applying Casteel to require sepa rate damages questions for each allegedly defamatory statement where defendant argued that some statements were not defamatory as a matter of law), with Beaumont v. Basham , 205 S.W.3d 608, 622–23 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied) (affirming use of broad-form submission for defamation where there were three allegedly defam atory statements but defendant had not argued that any particular one of these state ments was an invalid basis for defamation liability). For further discussion, see PJC 116.2 regarding broad-form issues and the Casteel doctrine.

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