PJC Business

C ONTRACTS

PJC 101.44

PJC 101.44 Unjust Enrichment (Comment) The doctrine of unjust enrichment is appropriate “when one person has obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage.” South western Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold Inc. , 308S.W.3d 909, 921 (Tex.2010) (quoting Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi , 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex.1992)). Because unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual, it may not be submitted to the jury “when a valid, express contract covers the subject matter of the parties’ dis pute.” Fortune Production Co. v. Conoco, Inc. , 52 S.W.3d 671, 684 (Tex. 2000) (citing TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein , 933 S.W.2d 591, 600 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (no recovery for unjust enrichment if the same subject is covered by an express contract)). But overpayments under a contract can be recov ered under unjust enrichment. Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Burlington North ern Railroad Co. , 966 S.W.2d 467, 469–70 (Tex. 1998). The Committee has not identified any authority specifically defining “undue advan tage” in this context. But the Dallas, San Antonio, and Corpus Christi–Edinburg courts of appeals have explained that unjust enrichment occurs when someone “has wrong fully secured a benefit or has passively received one which it would be unconscionable to retain.” Texas Integrated Conveyor Systems, Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc. , 300S.W.3d348, 367 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (citing Villarreal v. Grant Geophysical, Inc. , 136S.W.3d265, 270 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (quoting City of Corpus Christi v. S.S. Smith & Sons Masonry, Inc. , 736 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1987, writ denied))). The Texas Supreme Court has referred to unjust enrichment as an independent “cause of action” ( HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel , 982 S.W.2d 881, 891 (Tex. 1998)), “claim” ( Elledge v. Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp. , 240S.W.3d869, 870 (Tex. 2007) (percuriam)), and “theory” of recovery ( Marketing on Hold, Inc. , 308S.W.3d at921). Some courts of appeals have questioned whether unjust enrichment is an independent cause of action as opposed to a remedy for fraud or other improper conduct. See, e.g., Casstevens v. Smith , 269 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied) (is not an independent cause of action); R.M. Dudley Construction Co. v. Dawson , 258 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. denied) (same); Argyle Independent School District v. Wolf , 234 S.W.3d 229, 246 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (same); Mowbray v. Avery , 76 S.W.3d 663, 679 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. denied) (same); Walker v. Cotter Properties , 181 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (same); but see, e.g., Pepi Corp. v. Galliford , 254 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (is an independent cause of action); Elledge , 240S.W.3d at 870 (determining that “unjust enrichment claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations”); Clark v. Dillard’s, Inc. , 460 S.W.3d 714, 720–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.) (same). [PJC 101.45 is reserved for expansion.]

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