PJC Business

DTPA/I NSURANCE C ODE

PJC 102.8

ing producing cause as being a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, and with out which the injury would not have occurred . . . is the definition that should be given in the jury charge”). “For DTPA violations,” the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that “only producing cause must be shown.” Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump , 330 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd. , 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995)). In Ledesma , the supreme court explained that, “[t]o say that a producing cause is ‘an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause that, in a natural sequence, produces the incident in question’ is incomplete and, more importantly, provides little concrete guidance ... [and] little practical help” to modern jurors. Ledesma , 242 S.W.3d at 46. The supreme court subsequently clarified Ledesma in Transcontinental Insurance Co. , wherein it reasoned that, although “the use of the ‘efficient, exciting, or contributing cause’ lan guage” to define producing cause “is not, in itself, error,” the supreme court believes “those terms ought not to be used to define producing cause in the future.” Transconti nental Insurance Co. , 330 S.W.3d at 223–24 & n.12. Broad-form submission. PJC 102.8 is a broad-form question designed to be accompanied by one or more appropriate instructions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 requires that “the court shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form questions.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 277; see Thota v. Young , 366 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. 2012) (rule 277’s use of “whenever feasible” mandates broad-form submission in any or every instance in which it is capable of being accomplished). For further discussion, see PJC 116.2 regarding broad-form issues and the Casteel doctrine. Knowing or intentional conduct. If the defendant is found to have knowingly or intentionally engaged in any false, misleading, or deceptive conduct, the DTPA pro vides for additional damages. DTPA § 17.50(b)(1). See PJC 102.21 for a question on knowing or intentional conduct and PJC 115.11 for a question on additional damages. Vicarious liability. If the issue is the vicarious liability of one for another’s con duct, see Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats , 885 S.W.2d 96, 98–99 (Tex. 1994) (dis cussing principal’s liability for acts of agent within the actual or apparent scope of the agent’s authority in DTPA and Insurance Code case); and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Wilson , 768 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied) (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Love , 121 S.W.2d 986, 990 (Tex. 1938)) (company liable for unreasonable collection efforts of outside attorneys com mitted for the purpose of accomplishing the mission entrusted to the attorneys).

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